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Abstract- The Pattern of a Life (M.A. Thesis) Adam Riggio 
The goal of this investigation is to uncover, within the works under analysis, a concept of mind 
not as a thing, but a self-constituting pattern of perceptual activity. This work examines that 
concept in the context of several different philosophical investigations, particularly that of 
Patricia and Paul Churchland, and Maurice Merleau-Ponty. The goal is to blend ideas from 
several contemporary philosophical schools to create a non-reductive philosophy of mind that is 
nonetheless physicalist all the way through. It is a kind of proof by counter-ex mple that 
physicalism need not be reductive. 
The Churchlands create a new approach to human nature they call neurophilosophy. Their 
account of thinking and perception understands such activities as the continuing formation and 
transformation of ordered patterns of neuroelectrical activity in the brain. Yet the Churchlands' 
particular brand of physicalism, which they call 'eliminative materialism,' con iders non-
neurological ways of understanding perceiving and thinking to be mistaken - so philosophy will 
be replaced by neurology. My first chapter ends with a critique of the Churchlands' epistemology 
which points out the flaw in the eliminative understanding of knowledge. 
The second chapter examines the functionalist philosophy of the recent work of J aegwon Kim, 
and borrows the idea of the pattern as it occurs in an essay of David Lewis. Kim offers an 
approach to the nature of scientific understanding that gives relevance to the functional talk of 
propositional attitudes, even as we accept that a belief is itself a complex patterning andre-
patterning in the extremely multi-layered neural network that is the brain. Lewis' metaphor gives 
one the clearest image of the particular kind of existence of the mind, when the mind is 
considered to be a continually re-constituting pattern of activity of a body perceiving the world 
and moving around in it. 
The final chapter examines what I think is a very direct engagement with the concept of the 
individual as a pattern constituted in the activity of a body perceiving the world and moving in 
it. This is precisely Merleau-Ponty's concept of'bodily life,' as he expresses it in his book, The 
Phenomenology of Perception. The analysis of this concept takes up the first half of the last 
chapter. Finally, I examine the work of Evan Thompson, particularly his recent Mind in Life, 
which articulates Merleau-Ponty's concept of bodily life in a physicalist context. For the purposes 
of this thesis, this work also provides an answer to the extreme reductive char cter of the 
Churchlands' eliminative physicalism. He asks what kind of physical body can carry out the 
activities constitutive of mind, perception and motion, and finds this to be a y body constituted 
in a metabolic chemical activity. The human style of mind is a highly complex articulation of the 
perceptual and motive activity. 
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Introduction 
This thesis examines the following concept as it can be expressed in a non-reductive 
physicalist understanding of the universe - that an organism's mind is constituted in that 
organism's activities of perception and movement; that each organism constitutes itself in the 
world as an individual as it perceives and moves. This concept implies that the mind is not a 
thing, but a pattern of activity constituted in perceiving and moving. This pattern that is mind 
does not exist before the organism perceives and moves in the world, but is constituted through 
this activity in the world. My inquiry will take the form of a survey of several primary texts in 
which the concept of mind as a pattern of activity occurs both explicitly and implicitly. These 
texts each engage with the concept of mind as activity, and connect it with two problems in 
philosophy of mind - the nature of experiential qualia and reductionism. I first examine Patricia 
and Paul Churchland because the understanding of mind constituted as the perceptual activity of 
an organism is implicit in their work. In chapter two, I examine how this concept appears in 
functionalist writers Jaegwon Kim and David Lewis, and use this philosophy to critique certain 
aspects of the Churchlands' work. In chapter three, works of Maurice Merleau-Ponty and his 
physicalist follower Evan Thompson are key to my examination of that acti "ty which constitutes 
mind - perception and motion - enacted by a physical thing: an organism. 
My investigation is also defined by an opposition to reductionism in philosophy of mind. 
The key premise of reductionist accounts of knowledge is that once one knows the underlying 
causes and conditions of a phenomenon, one knows everything worth knowing about the 
phenomenon in question. I am interested in a non-reductive physicalism because reductive 
explanations ignore that which is constituted via its causes and conditions, making causes and 
conditions more important than the thing itself. In the context of philosophy of mind, the 
reductive mode of explanation has had considerable success in building a concept of mind that is 
wholly neural, until it comes time for the reductive explanation of qualia. This is the stumbling 
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block of much recent philosophy of mind, as the qualia of experience are seemingly irreducible. 
David Chalmers articulated this apparent impasse in his essay "Facing Up to the Problem of 
Consciousness." It centres on exactly the problem of experiential qualia and states clearly his 
inability to come up with a solution. In this sense, he serves as a good representative of those 
puzzled over the qualia question in analytic philosophy of mind. "There is nothing that we know 
more intimately than conscious experience, but there is nothing that is harder to explain."' There 
is a point in our explanation of the life of the mind at which language breaks down, he says, and 
we are left with mere entreaties to the 'raw feels' of experience. What is it like to be in pain? 
What is it like to have the flu? What is it like to roll down the first hill of the l rgest roller-coaster 
in Disneyland? What is it like to be a human? Chalmers calls this the hard problem of 
consciousness, the possibility of the investigation of consciousness in general. 
Many of the particular aspects of consciousness are the objects of successful scientific 
inquiries. The qualia of experience, says Chalmers, are irreducible insofar as they cannot be 
explained as something other than what he calls 'raw feels' and 'what-it-is-like'ness. As such, he 
regards the issue of what qualia are and how they are produced as impossible to solve. The first 
chapter of this thesis examines a radical yet surprisingly simple move to answer the qualia 
problem. This is the physicalism of the Churchlands, which they call 'neurophilosophy.' 
Neurophilosophy is an approach to the problems of philosophy of mind and the phenomena of 
mental life which sees the answers to these problems in the science of neurology. That is, the 
Churchlands hold that the problems of philosophy of mind will not be solved by the philosophers, 
but will be solved by neurological researchers, and that it is the job of the philosophical 
community to take the quantitative data of neurological research and render it in prose able to 
'Chalmers, David. "Facing Up to the Problem of Consciousness." Philosophy of Mind: A Guide and 
Anthology. Pg. 617. John Heil, ed. Oxford University Press. (2004. O rig. 1994) 
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reach mass consumption and comprehension.2 Their approach to the problem of qualia is that we 
find the answers of what qualia are by examining the sensorimotor system of humans and other 
animals, and that we will- for example- be able to answer Thomas Nagel's famous question of 
what it is like to be a bat3 by analysing the chiropteric sensorimotor system. The Churchlands 
conduct neurological investigations into the mechanisms of consciousness and argue that the 
sensorimotor system itself constitutes qualia. Qualia are not things that exist over and above 
one's sensorimotor system, but according to the Churchlands are themselves constituted in 
neuroelectrical activity. There is no need to reduce qualia to any physical correlate, they say, 
because qualia are themselves physical. Though one may come to understand the causes and 
conditions of the constitution of qualia in neuroelectrical activity, this does not exhaust one's 
understanding of that which is constituted. While Chalmers would certainly have been aware of 
the Churchlands' work, his essay stakes a position contra theirs, stating that qualia are irreducible. 
Yet he also puts himself in a position similar to the Churchlands, saying that s ch irreducibility 
means qualia are inexplicable, conflating reduction and explanation. I hold this conflation to be a 
mistake. 
The Churchlands' writings are almost encyclopedic in breadth of neurological answers to 
philosophical questions of mind, and throughout their ouvre is a focus on perception as an act 
made possible by certain physical systems. That is, the sensorimotor apparatus of perception is 
constantly in motion, constantly acting, constantly perceiving. They concentrate on the physical 
thing that is the human neural system and the system of sensory organs that re part of the 
apparatus without which the human is a heap of meat, incapable of motion. It is not simply the 
physical presence and structure of the sensorimotor system that explains the activities to which we 
' This is a position with a long history, generally referred to as 'materialism' in the Western philosophical 
tradition. My position regarding the Churchlands' place in materialism of Western philosophy is that they 
are a new round in an old dispute between reductionist and non-reductionist accounts of mind, a round 
defined by the particular challenges of contemporary neurological science. 
' Nagel, Thomas. "What Is It Like to Be a Bat?" Philosophy of Mind: A Guide and Anthology. Pp. 528-38. 
John Heil, ed. Oxford University Press. (2004. Orig. 197 4) 
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normally refer as 'mental,' but that sensorimotor system must be continually acting and in 
motion for the individual organism to live and survive. The Churchlands understand the human 
as an apparatus which must be in constant activity. The first chapter in part introduces the 
Churchlands' philosophy and examines their approach to the qualia question summarized above. 
Despite their concentration on understanding mental activity as the continuing function 
of a sensorimotor system, the Churchlands are opposed to the functionalist school of philosophy 
of mind. They say this is because of the functionalist persistence in using the word 'mind' at all, 
when they should simply refer to the functions of the physical sensorimotor apparatus. For the 
Churchlands, the concept of mind should be removed from philosophy, because what there 
actually is, is the brain and the rest of the sensorimotor system. The Churchlands call their 
approach to the concept of mind - the approach of calling for its removal from the list of valid 
philosophical concepts - eliminative materialism, and it is the most extreme form of the 
reductionist concept of knowledge. The explication of the Churchlands' neurophilosophy and the 
solutions it offers to the problem Chalmers states about the seeming ineffability of qualia will 
begin the first chapter. From there, we will examine the problem of eliminativism and the 
eliminative accusation that philosophical concepts not based in a purely objective account are 
obsolete and illegitimate. This latter, critical look at eliminativism will centre round how the 
Churchlands privilege knowledge of an objective perspective over the subjective perspective. My 
point in the last half of chapter one is that the objective and subjective perspectives in the context 
of epistemology do not constitute a choice of either the former or the latter. In that section, I will 
explain fully what I mean when I speak of the 'purely objective' and 'purely subjective.' By 
analysing the activity of perception, one can drop this epistemological hierarchy of perspective 
from the investigation of mind. 
This thesis is non-reductive in its approach to philosophy. My goal is to deepen the 
understanding of the concept of mind as activity in a physicalist context by examining how that 
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concept is treated in several works throughout contemporary philosophy. The econd chapter will 
look at the concept as it occurs in functionalist accounts of mind, particularly how it appears in 
Jaegwon Kim's philosophy of science. Of particular importance is an idea that David Lewis 
described, almost as a throwaway comment in an essay on reductive philosophy of mind - the 
concept of the mind as a pattern coalescing from an assemblage, a whole that exists differently 
than would an inventory of its parts. This image best defines the concept of mind as activity as I 
want to articulate it- a pattern of events, movements, and activities, unified by the physical 
unity of the body carrying out those activities. 4 This pattern of a body's activity comes to 
constitute the individual itself. This thesis will focus on this single example from Lewis' wide-
ranging work on mind, this image of the process of thinking and movement. Lewis described this 
concept of the pattern only briefly in 1994, but a highly detailed investigation of this concept 
was carried out in 1945- The Phenomenology of Perception by Maurice Merleau-Ponty. 
The third, final, chapter will examine the constitution of an individual as a pattern of 
activity as the concept appears in that work, in the works of philosopher Evan Thompson, and his 
collaboration with Francisco Varela. The reason that we examine Merleau-Ponty's analysis of the 
individual is that he develops the same concept in The Phenomenology of Perception as we had 
earlier interpreted from the analytic philosophers mentioned above - the individual constituted as 
activity. The main difference between them is that Merleau-Ponty's analysis is completely neutral 
on the question of substance. He instead focusses on how the individual acts in such a manner as 
to constitute her individuality. The activity of the individual is constrained by the surrounding 
events in the world in which it lives, and so impacts the constitutive activity of the individual. 
But this activity also transforms the world through the individual's adaptation and manipulation 
of it. This activity of perceptive motion creates a dynamic of mutual co-constitution of the 
individual and the world in which it lives. Merleau-Ponty understands the pattern of a life as not 
• Lewis, David. "Reduction of Mind." Papers in Metaphysics and Epistemology. Cambridge University Press. 
(1999 Orig. 1994) 
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only the activity of the individual, but also the interdependence of the individual and the world 
in a relationship of mutual co-constitutive activity. And this activity of self-constitution is not 
only co-constitutive of the individual person itself, but also co-constitutes the organism's 
surroundings. 
Evan Thompson, in his 2007 book Mind in Life, takes Merleau-Ponty's analysis of the co-
constitutive activity of an individual in the world, and describes it in a physicalist framework 
informed by the principles of current biological research. Thompson aims explicitly to find a 
principle of unification between the analytic framework that seeks compatibility with scientific 
research into biology and neurology, and the phenomenological and psycho! gical analysis of the 
individual acting in the world. Thompson writes as if the analytic and continental traditions of 
thought can engage in dialogue, himself constructing such a dialogue between the two traditions. 
In doing so, he shapes a compelling understanding of the constitution of the mind, the 
individual, and the significance of the world. The concept in philosophy of mind central to our 
whole inquiry is that the activity of the individual in the world constitutes all those processes that 
we colloquially attribute to mind. The activities of perception and thought are themselves 
constitutive of mind, and Thompson finds these activities in all physical articulations of life. So 
by this point, we have come to understand that the human mind is a particularly human thing, 
but the activities that constitute mind itself are present in all organisms, and that mind generally 
is a far more varied and complex phenomenon than has often been thought in much of the 
history of philosophy. 
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I. Neurophilosophy and the Problem of Eliminativism 
The first section of chapter one will sketch how the Churchlands situate their own philosophy in 
relation to the popular image of mind. The project of neurophilosophy is to explain the actions of 
mind as physical events, as states of the brain and patterns of neural activity. What in colloquial 
language is called a thought or a belief is the expression in that colloquial language of a complex 
pattern of neural activity. I intend to show that their philosophy of mind-as-brain is so radical 
because they give a powerful privilege to purely objective accounts and denounce accounts 
featuring some degree of subjectivity as inherently distorting. The Churchlands' own account of 
mind will be the subject of this chapter's section two. Section three will consis t of my critique of 
the Churchlands precisely for the privilege they accord to pure objectivity, with an analysis of the 
relation between subjectivity and objectivity that underlies their thinking. I will argue that this 
analysis is an improper way to consider subjectivity and objectivity, and that their treatment of 
the objective and subjective constitutes a powerful flaw in their philosophy. 
1. The Relation of Neurology to the Concept of Mind 
Patricia and Paul Churchland5 present their works as among the most radical statements 
in contemporary materialist philosophy of mind. For the eliminative philosophy of mind does 
not truly deal with the concept of mind- indeed, the Churchlands' goal is to remove all terms 
referring to mind from their philosophical language. Their long-term goal is to show how humans 
should eliminate any colloquial reference to mind at all. They speak instead of the organism, 
whose actions are best described in the language of neurology - to be human is to be the human 
brain. This entails the emptiness of many traditional concepts of philosophy, such as the nature of 
the soul, God, and spirit. With this approach to philosophy, they open a wide space to develop an 
5 Churchland, Patricia. Brain-Wise: Studies in Neurophilosophy. MIT Press. (2002) 
Churchland, Patricia. Neurophilosophy: Toward a Unified Science of the Mind-Brain. MIT Press. (1986) 
Churchland, Paul M. The Engine of Reason, the Seat of the Soul. MIT Press. ( 1995) 
Churchland, Paul M. "Eliminative Materialism and the Propositional Attitudes." Philosophy of Mind: A Guide 
and Anthology. Pp. 382-400. Heil, John; ed. Oxford University Press. (2004 Orig. 1981) 
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ontology based on the organism's life in the world, based on the discoveries of neurological 
science. This life is constituted in the activity of the organism, as the organism moves, perceives, 
thinks, and so on. The participation of the organism as a part of the world constitutes the very 
individuality of that organism - moreso than the physical makeup of its body. These are the 
positive ramifications of the Churchlands' philosophy, which they themselves do not explore. 
Because of their eliminativism, the Churchlands are content with describing the physical body 
with only a neuro/biological approach. They do not seem to understand that their description of 
humanity opens up more possibilities for thinking than it closes down. 
Of particular interest for the mission statement of eliminative materialism is the 
commonsense laws of what Paul Churchland called 'folk psychology.' As Churchland describes 
folk psychology, this is the concept that our mental states of belief and desire a use our 
intentional behaviours. In philosophy of mind, these propositions connecting beliefs and desires 
to behaviour are called the propositional attitudes. Churchland takes folk psyc ology to be a 
predictive and explanatory theory of human behaviour and thought, which aims to be a complete 
picture of human life. He was the first to describe folk psychology in this way, and does so in 
order to render the concept vulnerable to his argument against its legitimacy. He sets up 
neurology and folk psychology as competing theories of the mind, and the theory which 
encompasses more phenomena and explanatory possibilities should be embraced, its competitor 
rejected. Churchland's account of folk psychology proceeds as follows. Using the propositional 
attitudes to explain behaviour presumes that there are mental entities - such a beliefs and desires 
- that serve a causal role in human action.6 For example, Tim believes that Duane considers him a 
failure in life, this belief caused Tim to become angry, and it was this belief in conjunction with 
his emotional state that constituted the cause of Tim shooting Duane in the crotch at close range 
during a paintball tournamene The belief is an explanation for the event, which is seen as Tim's 
6 Churchland 1 Paul M. 11Ei iminative Materialism and the Propositional Attitudes.11 Pp. 383-6. 
7 Pegg 1 Simon; Jessica Stevenson. 11Battles.11 Spaced. Channel 4 Television. ( 1999) 
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intentional action. "The average person is able to explain, and even predict, the behaviour of 
other persons with a facility and success that is remarkable .... But explanations presuppose laws 
- rough and ready ones, at least - that connect the explanatory conditions with the behaviour 
explained."8 This example is a plausible account of how people use propositions about beliefs, 
desires, and emotions- the language, or set of propositions, describes the int ntional actions of a 
freely choosing agent- the folk-psychological picture of the human. 
Beliefs and desires are the elementary objects which folk psychology posits as the most 
basic units of thinking, Churchland says. Folk psychology has as the centre of the theory an 
image of the mind itself as a thing. When we talk of beliefs, thoughts, and other mental entities 
we mean that they are things that exist as part of one's mind- Churchland's description of folk 
psychology takes each mental entity to be a thing. Each time we speak of a mental thing such as a 
belief, Churchland says we commit ourselves to an ontology of each particular belief being an 
existing thing, like a rock or a shampoo bottle or a curry. Yet he says that we have not yet seen a 
belief, or built the requisite equipment to do so, and eliminative philosophy takes as a premise 
that it is only proper to speak of any entity if that speech act refers to some thing. That is, it is 
legitimate to speak of a belief, desire, or thought only if there is such a thing. This is not to say 
that reference to a non-existent thing is nonsense, for that would mean that all talk about 
fictional entities would be nonsensical, which is not what the Churchlands want to say. 
Their central issue is that to base an ontology on reference to what does not exist is a 
mistake, and their case is that this is precisely the mistake made with folk psychology. This point 
also lies at the basis of the Churchlands' critique of most philosophies of min that compete with 
their own. Throughout "Eliminative Materialism," there is criticism directed at any philosopher 
who uses the word 'belief,' as if the simple use of a noun implies the existence of a physical thing. 
If I am to justify my use of the noun 'belief,' Churchland says that I must be able to observe a 
belief with the proper equipment just as I can observe an electron or an extrasolar planet with the 
' Churchland, Paul M. "Eliminative Materialism and the Propositional Attitudes." Pg. 383. 
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proper equipment. He concludes that we will never observe a thing that we would call a belief in 
the same manner as we would an extrasolar planet, because beliefs do not exist as things, only as 
fictions. In speaking of mental entities as if they existed, we posit mental entities as existing as 
the explanatory ground of human actions. Until such mental entities are detected in some way, 
the ontological posits of folk psychology are used frequently in daily life, but remain untested in 
the most rigorous sense. The aim of the eliminativist project is to show that such a test will 
ultimately fail, and that a complete reorientation of what is colloquially taken to be the 
foundation ofbehaviour is necessary. 
The eliminative project considers the propositional attitudes as a unified predictive I 
explanatory theory which legitimizes vague talk of beliefs and desires. Churchland makes a case 
that the propositional attitudes are an utter failure as a predictive I explanatory theory. Folk 
psychology, he says, gives us a reasonable structure for the prediction and explanation of the 
beliefs of fellow humans and other animal species. But the theory fails when one attempts to 
pinpoint the specific entities themselves in the physical being of the individuals. Folk psychology 
posits that certain things - beliefs, desires, and so on - are existing things, wh n they really are 
not. Churchland says that neurology has allowed us to learn more about thinking than folk 
psychology without making unnecessary posits of existence. Neurology has uncovered greater 
complexity in thinking than had been possible to imagine in the context of folk psychology, such 
as the following. 
As examples of central and important mental phenomena that remain largely or wholly 
mysterious within the framework of folk psychology, consider the nature and dynamics of 
mental illness ... the internal construction of a 3D visual image from subtle difference in 
the 2D array of stimulations in our respective retinas. Consider the rich variety of 
illusions, visual and otherwise. Or consider the miracle of memory, with its lightning 
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capacity for relevant retrieval.9 
The discoveries Churchland brings up in the above quote are challenges to folk psychology 
because neurological science presents them as intrinsic to our understanding of thinking. Yet 
they are entirely new to the public account of mind, only arising in the last century. These 
concepts are entirely novel to folk psychological reasoning, and could not have been generated 
within such reasoning. These failures show that folk psychology lacks the comprehensiveness of 
neurology as a predictive I explanatory theory. Replacing folk psychology wit neurology, as 
Churchland says should be done, can provide a radical reorientation of our very image of what the 
mind is. 
The "Eliminative Materialism and the Propositional Attitudes" essay is the early mission 
statement of the Churchlands' project, and clearly stated the major themes of their later 
philosophical works throughout the 1990s. It is from this point that I shall begin the exposition of 
that project. The ontology of eliminative materialism begins with that which can be physically 
observed - the brain in the larger context of the neural system. They describe the neurological 
predictive I explanatory theory of the mind as an entirely objective account. Events and the 
relations between them are described using entirely third-person language - the creation of the 
individual's perspective itself is explained as an entirely objective process. First-person perspective 
holds a central place in folk psychology- there is an I who believes and desires, and much of the 
predictive and explanatory application of folk psychology is in the relation with other I' s, 
working out the reasons why some I acted one way or what some I might do in the future. I will 
argue that the Churchlands are hostile to folk psychology because the first-person perspective is 
the framework of folk-psychological predictions and explanations. 
A more perfect science, according to the Churchlands' view, is one th t transforms the 
• Churchland, Paul M . "Eliminative Material ism." Pg. 387. He also mentions several avenues that remain 
something of a mystery to neuroscience in the 2000s, such as the faculty of creative imagination, our 
knowledge of the mechanics of sleep and dreaming, and the foundations for individual differences in 
intelligence. Those that I have quoted have, between 1981 and 2007, been relative success stories for 
neurology in terms of what knowledge we have gained from scientific study of these particular problems. 
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first-person- subjective - account into a third-person- objective- account. Doing so makes 
most talk of the mental redundant. Paul Churchland's argument in "Eliminative Materialism" 
implies that it is this subjective perspective that leads one to believe that there really are such 
things as beliefs and desires. Subjectivity is the source material for folk psychology, and since folk 
psychology, according to the Churchlands, encourages one to believe in non-existent entities-
beliefs, desires, and so on - subjectivity is not a valid approach to working out what does and does 
not exist. As far as the Churchlands are concerned, beliefs and desires do not exist, so any 
perspective that leads one to the conclusion that they do is a faulty perspective. The Churchlands 
aim to build a purely objective philosophy of mind so as to avoid these faulty conclusions, and 
this they call neurophilosophy. We should first understand this new concept of neurophilosophy 
before a proper critique can be made. The next section will explain neurophilosophy's concept of 
mind, and the section following that will critique neurophilosophy for its bias of the objective 
over the subjective. 
2. Neurophilosophy's Account of Thinking 
This section shall be concerned with the question of what exactly the Churchlands 
consider thought to be. If beliefs, desires, thoughts, et al, do not exist as things, then do we ever 
really think? They never deny that, but instead give an account of thinking, not thoughts. Paul 
Churchland at the end of "Eliminative Materialism" imagines distantly future societies where 
people communicate not with language, but with person-to-person neural interfaces like radio 
antennas for the brain - a kind of technological telepathy. Such speculation does not continue in 
the rest of the Churchlands' work - if it did, they would no longer be writers of philosophy, but of 
speculative fiction. The interaction of neurons in the system of the human brain as central 
coordinator of the sensorimotor system is key to all human thought and action. The activity of 
the sensorimotor system itself is characterised in a manner securely rooted in the neurological 
Page 12 
research of the last twenty years, particularly in the insights of the efforts to replicate neural 
activity in artificial systems. These artificial systems are themselves neural networks built out of 
inorganic components, and the brain is a system of many such networks. We can consider the 
Churchlands as giving an account of the brain as a network of networks, all in terdependent on 
each other in the totality of brain activity. The network of neural networks that is the brain is 
seen as the medium through which thinking and qualitative experience takes place. The 
neuroelectrical activity of the neural network composes the qualitative experience of the world, a 
map of the world in the brain. These maps in the fabric of the brain are our actual experience, and 
these maps are translations of the world itself onto physical neural networks. The 
neurophilosophical project seeks to describe this act of neural mapping, and show how all the 
typical attitudes of life emerge from these experiential maps. 
Patricia Churchland's simplest description of the physical acting organism is articulated in 
the context of investigating how sensorimotor control works. To take her own example, a person 
sees a plum hanging off the branch of a tree, and because this person is hungry, she wants to 
grasp the plum with her hand and pull it off the tree to eat. 
Simplified, the problem for a nervous system is this: the visual system has a retina-based 
story about where the plum is, but the motor system has to have a join t-angle story about 
where the plum is, since it is the arm that must reach and the fingers that must grasp the 
plum. So the motor system needs to know what joint-angle combination will serve to 
achieve the goal. 10 
Completing this action involves multiple emulators, existing as part of the nervous system, which 
map the organism's surroundings as patterns of neuroelectrical activity. An organism's action in 
a world is the identification of a point in space followed by or combined with the movement 
towards that point. The act in question is to reach for a plum hanging on a tree and pluck it from 
its branch. But Churchland understands that act in terms of the identification of a point in space, 
and a series of movements toward that point. She considers all data other than this basic 
1
° Church land, Patricia. Brain-Wise: Studies in Neurophilosophy. Pg. 77. MIT Press. (2002) 
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explanation extraneous - a paradigm case of reductive understanding. The function of the 
nervous system of the organism is to map action plans, simulating all action before it is done, but 
in such small timeframes that the mapping of the action is virtually simultaneous with the action 
itself. Plotting the physical location of objects around the organism is a visual problem, solved 
through the neural mapping systems having to do with the vision-sensing apparatus of the 
organism- the eyes. Light rays enter the eyes and the neural system maps that light into visual 
data, and this visual data is a representation of the organism's surroundings - this visual map 
emulates the organism's surroundings. And the visual emulation is represented again by the 
neural network controlling the organism's physical movements, what Patricia Churchland calls 
the joint-angle representational system. For this map, the visual data has been transformed -
represented again - into a new context, an emulation of the organism's physical movements in 
space and over time as the central object in one's surroundings. 
She diagrams her emulator model of neural network action-planning with the plum 
problem. The goal of the organism is to get the plum, and the brain runs an emulator of as many 
possible actions as it takes until the automatic functions of the neural network calculate that error 
in movement is at its smallest possible value. Actions are plottings on the representative map of 
the body's possible physical movements in space over time prior to the movement itself, which is 
the enactment of the successful plot. An organism moves through its neural etwork plotting the 
body's actions on a representative map, assembled from sensory data. The essential action of an 
organism's neural network is mapping, according to Churchland. In this case, the coordinating 
neural network of the sensory system builds a representative map of the organism's surroundings. 
Then the motor control network re-represents this map as a sensorimotor plan for the organism's 
physical action. Churchland even gives an account on the emulator model of involuntary 
motions like breathing or absent-minded motions like stroking one's thigh while deep in thought 
on some other topic. 11 One should also take note that she describes the neuroelectrical activity 
" Churchland, Patricia. Brain-Wise: Studies in Neurophilosophy. Pp. 80-8 . 
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within the organism, as well as the behaviour of the organism in the world by reaching for the 
plum and eating it. 
Neural representative mapping is not only done with the plotting of one's surroundings 
and one's physical movements in that context. A key example that both Patricia and Paul 
Churchland use in their works is the process of face recognition. Using research on artificial face 
recognition software, they make an account of how the brain builds possibly the most complex 
representative map of the human organism - the map on which are plotted all the possibilities of 
human faces. It is also through this example that they each demonstrate what they take to be the 
mathematical foundation of the neural system's representational function - vector coding. The 
Churchlands describe as a physicalist version of folk psychology the idea that individual thoughts 
are themselves encoded in the brain as physical unities - that we can find one particular brain 
state common to all individual brains for, as an example, the thought 'Paris is capitol of France.' 
As explained earlier, it is Patricia Churchland's premise that if one uses a term to refer to an 
object, then that object must physically exist exactly as the term describes. Not to do so is to 
misapply the term in question to the object. Instead of this isomorphic conformity of one belief 
statement to one corresponding physical structure, encoding in the neural system 
depends on the idea that features are represented in specific patterns of activity in a 
population of units, where each neuron has a tuning curve, perhaps quite broad, and 
tuning curves overlap, perhaps quite a lot. . . . The elements in a particular [mathematical 
value of a] vector are values standing for properties such as the activity levels of each 
neuron in the relevant population. 12 
There is no single neuron or energy level of a single neuron that corresponds to a thought as we 
would typically express it in colloquial language. Instead, thoughts and representational maps of 
emulation that we have described above are patterns in huge collections of ne rons. These 
patterns are best represented in our own understanding in the mathematics of vector encoding. 
Vector mathematics is how Churchland takes the brain to form its representational maps. 
12 Churchland, Patricia. Brain-Wise. Pp. 290- l . Italics hers. Insertion mine. 
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The full power of vector coding to form representational maps in the neural network of 
the organism is displayed in the account that Patricia and Paul Churchland give of how the brain 
recognizes faces. It is important to note that this is their precise terminology - not how the 
person, or how the organism recognizes faces, but how the brain recognizes faces. In both Patricia 
Churchland' s Brain-Wise and Paul Churchland' s The Engine of Reason, The Seat of the Soul, 
there is a diagram of the type of mapping they envision taking place in the h man neural 
network. It is a diagram of what they call the parameter space. Their diagrams consist of a cube, 
the height represents the minimum to maximum values for nose width, the length the minimum 
to maximum of mouth fullness, and the cube's width the minimum to maximum values for how 
far apart the eyes are. This is a highly simplistic way of representing what is in fact a far more 
complex set of values. They themselves refer to their diagrams as crude and r dimentary, as it is 
only possible on a sheet of paper to represent easily three dimensions. '3 An accurate diagram to 
represent facial mapping in the human neural system would have 80 dimensions, if the fairly 
successful artificial face recognition software programs are any guide to the complexity of the 
vector coding in the human neural network. 
If the artificial networks are any guide to understanding the representational mapping of 
faces carried out by the human neural network - and both Churchlands assure us that the success 
rate of the artificial programs constitutes good evidence for thinking so - then we have a clear 
sign that the human brain operates on a system of multi-dimensional vector coding. Neurons 
operate in a manner interdependent on each other. No one neuron represents any one element-
neurons all function together in a network which, as a whole, represents features of the world and 
activities of other parts of the organism's neural network. The particular state of each individual 
neuron is itself a value in a representational parameter space embedded within the neural network 
itself. The state of a neuron is but one single value in a complex representational map of multiple 
" Churchland, Patricia . Brain-Wise . Pg. 292. 
Churchland, Paul. The Engine of Reason, The Seat of the Soul. Pg. 28, ff. MIT Press. (1995) 
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dimensions. Each dimension in a neural representative map is all the possible values for one 
feature represented in the map. Patricia Churchland uses the term 'hyperspace' to refer to the 
huge number of dimensions of values this representational space can have. Regarding the 
representative vector coded maps that store information, these are even more complex, as they 
are estimated to consist of at least 300,000 dimensions.14 
3. Eliminative Philosophy as Pure Objectivity 
We now have a basic outline of the neurophilosophical account of the activities we 
typically associate with the concept of mind. The purpose of this section is to understand the - in 
my view, improper- privilege the Churchlands give to the objective perspective in this account. 
The activities of the individual - which that individual herself may describe using the first -person 
perspective- are here described from an entirely third-person perspective. This issue of 
perspective is not merely a matter of whether one says T or 'it' as the active subject of one's 
sentence when describing some action. One can characterize the first-person and third-person 
perspectives respectively as subjective and objective. These can be taken as epistemological 
approaches to the world. The subjective is to perceive and understand from the perspective of an 
individual embedded and living in the world. The objective is to divorce one's perspective from 
one's individuality, which enables one to perceive and understand from a perspective without 
perspective. We can better understand the perspective of pure objectivity with input from 
Thomas Nagel, in his book The View From Nowhere. He describes a continuum of perspectives, 
ranging from a purely subjective to a purely objective. An epistemological perspective can be 
constituted as a complex blend of subjectivity and objectivity, but what interests me here are the 
most extreme articulations of these perspectives. Pure subjectivity he describe as a simple 
"Churchland, Patricia . Brain-Wise. Pp. 292-301 . These are not actual spatial dimensions existing in the 
brain, but the dimensions necessary for a map to represent accurately the information encoded in the 
brain for various functions and contexts, where each dimension stands for a particular attribute measured 
in the encoded levels of neuroelectrical activity. 
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solipsism, which we progress beyond when 
[We] see that our perceptions are caused by the action of things on us, through their 
effects on our bodies, which are themselves parts of the physical world. The next step is to 
realize that since the same physical properties that cause perceptions in us through our 
bodies also produce different effects on other physical things and can exist without 
causing any perceptions at all, their true nature must be detachable from their perceptual 
appearance and need not resemble it. 15 
The perspective of pure objectivity is "not thinking of the physical world from our own particular 
point of view, [nor] thinking of it from a more general human perceptual point of view either: 
not thinking of how it looks, feels, smells, tastes, or sounds."16 This framework of pure objectivity 
is the conceptual foundation of the Churchlands' eliminative approach to philosophy of mind. 
The perspective of pure objectivity is precisely a perspective from nowhere, the point from which 
one can take an inventory of things that exist and catalogue the activities of those things. Any 
properties of qualia are not counted in such an inventory from this perspective because qualia are 
not themselves physical things. The problem of qualia in contemporary philosophy of mind is 
that they can be taken, as in Chalmers, as being irreducible to anything physical. The 
Churchlands say qualia are reducible, and so can be described from such a perspective of pure 
objectivity. I will critique this understanding of irreducibility in chapter two, but until then I 
continue the critique of eliminative philosophy. 
As Nagel describes the purely objective perspective, this is the mode of characterizing 
reality that the Churchlands aim for their neurophilosophy to achieve. The Churchlands aim to 
incorporate that which is peculiar to the subjective perspective into the purely objective account 
of the world they build. The perceptual qualities of how the world looks, feels, smells, tastes, and 
sounds are all explained as neuroelectrical activity.' ' We said earlier that the C urchlands found 
the subjective perspective inherently problematic, because it was the act of living one's life in the 
15 Nagel, Thomas. The View From Nowhere. Pg. 14. Oxford University Press. (1986) 
,. Nagel, Thomas. The View From Nowhere . Pg. 14. 
17 Churchland, Paul. The Engine of Reason, The Seat of the Soul. Pp. 21 -34. 
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subjectivity of the individual perspective that leads one to postulate the entities of folk 
psychology - the beliefs and desires and so on. Since beliefs and desires have no physical existence 
as things, any perspective that would make the existence of beliefs and desires seem plausible 
must be inherently flawed. The Churchlands intend to eliminate what they see as the mistakes 
about what exists which subjectivity makes possible by subsuming the activities that generate 
subjectivity in an objective account. 
Neurophilosophy casts the subjectivity of an individual's perception in living within an 
objective framework of neurological processes. As such, one can build an account of the human 
individual that does not account for beliefs and desires as actual entities, but as the patterns of 
activity that constitute themselves in a neural system. Neurophilosophy describes a belief not as a 
unified thing that exists in the brain, but as a pattern of neuroelectrical activity. A belief does not 
exist in the brain as a clearly identifiable object- which is the criterion the Churchlands give for 
saying that beliefs exist. A belief exists insofar as there is a complex pattern of continually 
shifting neuroelectrical activity throughout the neural networks of a human's brain that causes 
that human to act in a certain manner. We would define this manner ofbehaviour in colloquial 
language by saying something like, "Fred believes that x," a propositional attitude. The 
Churchlands' neurophilosophy is a way of looking at mind that is not only a thorough 
physicalism, but also gives no validity whatsoever to the subjective perspective. Objectively 
speaking, a belief does not exist, but the activity of believing does exist - such activity is the 
creation of several particular patterns in the neuroelectrical activity of an individual organism. 
Neurophilosophy is a purely objective way of rendering the subjective individual perspective of a 
life. While the Churchlands would consider it a mistake to refer to 'beliefs,' it is not so to refer to 
'believing,' for the reasons established above. 
What is the character of the world described from the purely objective perspective? The 
observer in the purely objective perspective is not a conventional observer. The objective 
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perspective as we have described it here is notable since it is not a perspective in the world, but a 
survey of the world from a position divorced from it. From the objective perspective, the perceiver 
is no longer part of the world perceived - he is instead an impassive observer, watching events 
unfold in the world as if they were on a map, describing physical relationship as they exist 
among thing to thing. We can say this method of description characterises how one thing is 
physically present among other things. Describing a thing in the context of its physical presence, 
it is only legitimate to discuss the thing's physical body, and location and motion relative to other 
things. Understanding the world in terms of its physical presence (that is, in terms of the 
objective perspective) is to understand the world as if one was mapping a complex pattern of 
events and things on a grid where there is no origin or centre point. The objective observer can 
understand how the different things move and relate to each other, but the purely objective 
perspective is the precise removal of perspective from one's account of the world. 
The observer and author of the description in the purely objective perspective is not 
related to that which is described, for the reasons that we have earlier explained about the apparent 
distortions that the Churchlands see inevitably coming from the subjective perspective. As Nagel 
describes pure objectivity, its proponents - the Churchlands in particular - se the approach as a 
means of escaping perspective, of standing outside the world and in an entirely neutral relation 
to the world. They would say that to describe objectively is to describe what really happens. 
Description from the objective perspective focusses on that which is; not that which ought to be 
or that which is formulated in any kind of intentional attitude. Such attitude , according to the 
Churchlands, are invalid for having nothing to do with what is physically pre ent. The accurate 
description is that given in the objective perspective - the description of things and their activity. 
This is physical presence - what it is to be considered as presence in the objective perspective. 
What is it about the subjective perspective that constitutes its difference from the 
objective? If we can cast the metaphysics of a world understood from the objective perspective as 
Page 20 
physical presence, then we can cast the subjective perspective as presence to the organism. 
Explaining the concept of presence to the organism requires some groundwork, supplied by my 
interpretation of the Churchlands' account of perception. This account is a purely objective 
description of how the subjective perspective works, as given in Brain-Wise. N urophilosophy 
describes organisms. The organism is observed to be physically present, and it is present only in 
the sense that the organism is a thing in the world that moves and acts. The objective perspective 
observes the organism in its existence - the organism is a physical presence in the world, existing 
among other things, some of which are also organisms. Physically, the organism senses, handles, 
and moves in relation to the things that surround it. Yet the Churchlands describe the organism 
as basically one thing existing among others. Neurophilosophy examines the eural mechanics of 
this thing. The parts of the mechanical system that the organism is, are likewi e things that exist 
with others in particular physical relationships. As an organism exists in its physical presence, it is 
one object among many, one thing moving among other things. 
Patricia Churchland takes the simplest sensory system, that of touch, and in explaining 
the basics of this category of perception, extrapolates to what is essential to all sensorimotor 
systems. She describes an experiment where a human fingertip is poked with the end of a stick. 
Each poking is carried out for the exact same amount of time, and with the exact same pressure. 
Only the shape of the stick's end is changed. The resulting neuroelectrical activity of the touch-
sensitive neurons varied in a manner of increasing firing frequency directly proportional to the 
increasing sharpness of the stick. The sharper the surface impacting the fingertip, the higher the 
frequency of electrical activity in the affected neurons. This neural data is the raw material for the 
touch-sensory qualia of experience.18 The relationship between the two things - the organism and 
the stick- is here described in a purely objective way that encompasses the constitution of the 
qualitative experience of that relationship in the subjective perspective. This constitution is the 
neural activity, the activity of the brain that constitutes experience from the urrounding events. 
" Churchland, Patricia. Brain-Wise. Pp. 95-7 . 
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The events themselves are encoded into the neuroelectrical pattern, consistently transformed 
from an event that is physically present in an organism's surroundings into a neuroelectrical code 
such that the encoded event now exists as it is present to the organism. 
This pattern of activity is itself the event, but the event as it is present to the organism, 
not as it is physically present. My choice of words may make me sound as if I bandon the 
physicalism which at the beginning of this thesis I professed my philosophical inquiry would hold. 
Physical presence and presence to the organism are two ways of describing the relation of one 
thing to another, and the different character of the relationship between things when one of 
more of those things is an organism. I will explain further the distinction between physical 
presence and presence to the organism over the rest of the thesis. The sensorimotor system itself 
takes events that coexist with the organism- events taking place within the organism's sensory 
reach - and encodes those events into the patterns of the neural network. With this account in 
mind, we can interpret the neurophilosophical account of perception as the translation of physical 
presence into presence for the organism. The Churchlands themselves never se this concept of 
translative perception, however. As I explained in §2 of this chapter, they instead discuss the 
sensorimotor neural networks as constituting the qualia of experience by representing them as 
neural maps of the organism's surroundings. I choose not to use the word 'representation,' 
because of the dualist connotations of the word. In the context that the Churchlands use it, one 
could interpret them - incorrectly in my view - as themselves guilty of a kind of neurological 
idealism, saying that one only experiences that which is represented inside the neural network 
and never the events themselves that surround one. This perceptual dualism is not how they or I 
intend to describe perception, so the way I use 'translation' is more faithful t the physicalist 
philosophy of mind I intend to articulate. So I describe perception here as translation from 
physical contact of one thing with another into a pattern of neuroelectrical activity. 
Understanding the translative concept of perception allows us to understand the concept 
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of presence to the organism. A thing is present to the organism when that thing is physically 
present such that an organism observes it and translates it from its simple physicality to a pattern 
of neuroelectrical activity constituted through the mechanical operation of the organism's 
sensorimotor system. Returning to Patricia Churchland's example of a sharp stick poking my 
fingertip, the event is described in its physical presence as the impact of one thing with another. 
The encoding action of perception brings the perceived thing into presence for the organism, but 
this does not mean the thing no longer exists as physically present. A thing's presence for the 
organism is another kind of presence, another way in which the thing exists, in addition to its 
physical presence. The event is translated into a new mode of presence in the act of perception. 
This new mode of presence - presence to the organism - is the presence of a thing as it is in 
qualitative experience. The qualia of experience themselves are constituted in the translative 
encoding actions of the physical sensorimotor apparatus for every individual organism, in the 
manner that the Churchlands described above. Chalmers' problem of qualia that we discussed in 
the introduction was his puzzlement over how experiential qualia themselves are part of a physical 
process. The process of encoding physically present events and things by a translation apparatus 
of neuroelectrical patterns is itself this physical process of constituting qualitative experience. 
The concepts central to our own account here of neurophilosophy - physical presence, 
presence to the organism, translative perception - are not the Churchlands' c ncepts, as the 
Churchlands restrict themselves to neurologically-themed language in their account of humanity. 
This is because of their doctrine of eliminativism described earlier. Yet these concepts have been 
derived from the Churchlands' philosophy, so that we can understand neurophilosophy from a 
non-neurological perspective of thought. From an eliminative materialist philosophy, to exist is 
to be physically present. Presence to the organism is how an existing thing is perceived by a 
perceiver, a perceiver being an organism having a sensorimotor system. Translative perception is 
the account of how a physically present thing is encoded in an organism's sensorimotor system as 
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a neuroelectrical pattern, becoming present to the organism. This activity is perception explained 
in a physicalist context. The greatest benefit of the Churchlands' neurophilosophy for my own 
inquiry into philosophy of mind is that they take it as possible that life itself in all its details is 
physical, and that neurology can have genuine philosophical import. Neurophilosophy constitutes 
a radical break with much of philosophical tradition, yet in its eliminativism it also constitutes a 
standpoint at which philosophical inquiry ends, because the reductive principle of eliminativism 
forbids the creation of new concepts. The Churchlands consider valid only those concepts that 
arise from the description of relations between physical things from a perspective that is situated 
outside all situatedness. For the Churchlands, to understand is to simplify radically one's account 
of that which you aim to understand, since one simplifies by rejecting concepts that do not 
directly refer to physical things that do exist. 
While the Churchlands have a great deal to offer in terms of physicalism, their 
eliminativism prevents me from giving them my whole-hearted support. My philosophical 
approach is based on building a nuanced understanding, instead of a reductive understanding. As 
it stands in the context of the Churchlands' own philosophy, the only concept that are valid for 
neurophilosophy are those concepts created from the examination of physical actions and 
relations from the objective perspective. In the rest of this investigation, I inte d to show how 
perspectives other than this one are not distortions of the real or generators of illusion, but can be 
quite productive for philosophy. The central concept of neurophilosophy that remains important 
to our inquiry is that mind, thoughts, beliefs, and so on do not exist as things - but are activities. 
That is, there are no thoughts or beliefs, but there is thinking and believing. The Churchlands 
develop this concept no farther beyond their description of the neuroelectrical activities that 
constitute thinking. The reason for this is their eliminative approach to philosophy. Where the 
Churchlands would discount all philosophies except for their own systematization of neurological 
research, I see potential to broaden and deepen our understanding of this concept of mind, 
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thought, and perception as activities that constitute themselves in the process of their own action. 
The following two chapters move my research away from strict neurophilosophy and searches for 
this concept as it is articulated in the works of other philosophical writers. This concept of mind as 
self-constituting'9 activity is the common region that connects several strands of contemporary 
philosophy, and the concept will lead us to interesting conclusions about what it is to be alive. 
19 The term 'self-constituting' is to be understood in a reflexive sense, as in, the activity itself generates and 
develops the activity as long as the activity continues. It is not to be understood as referring to some thing, 
the self, as in, the activity constitutes a thing called a self. The concept is important for my own project 
here insofar as no thing is created, only the activity. 
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II. The Concepts of Broad Physicalism 
The major point of this chapter is to examine how functionalist philosophy of mind can help 
build our non-reductive physicalism, and its limitations in this task. To do so, 1 will identify how 
the concept of mind as activity is present in functionalist philosophy of mind, and show - despite 
the protests of the Churchlands - the common conceptual territory between neurophilosophy and 
certain works that could be called functionalist in their treatment of mind. The commonality 
between neurophilosophy and functionalism consists precisely in their shared concentration on 
the mind as it is generated in the activity of a physical system. Where they differ is on the 
character of the language used to describe that activity. On the whole, many functionalists -
similarly to the Churchlands- take there to be no physical things called beliefs, for example, but 
affirm the activity of believing. Functionalism is not eliminative because such philosophies see no 
need to remove such nouns as 'belief from language. One must simply be aware that these nouns 
refer to activities. The first section gives the general picture of functionalism in this regard. The 
second section takes recent work by Jaegwon Kim to illustrate that while a fu ctionalist approach 
to mind avoids eliminative thinking, functionalism's conceptual framework remains mystified by 
the question of qualia. The third section expands on a metaphor in an essay by David Lewis to use 
his image of mind as pattern in the context of my own investigation into the concept of mind as 
activity. The Churchlands discussed how a neural system inside an organism constitutes what is 
colloquially called mind in the activities of perception and motion. Lewis' image will be the first 
step in showing how an organism's activity in the world as well as in its sensorimotor system 
plays an equally important role in constituting mind. 
1. What Is Functionalism? 
We have discussed how the Churchlands' neurophilosophy understands that which we 
colloquially call 'mental' as a matter of the activities of a complex neural sensorimotor system. 
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This creates a conceptual common ground with the mainstream of analytic philosophy of mind, 
functionalism. Functionalist philosophy is blatantly centred on the principle that mind is to be 
defined not as a thing, but as an activity of an organic body - though without the neurological 
rigour of the Churchlands. It is a physicalism without a reductionist take on its concepts. Broadly 
speaking, functionalism accepts a distinction in language between talk of roles and talk of 
occupants. In philosophy of mind, terms of mental states are taken to refer to roles which 
particular physical states fill. Pain is often used to illustrate this. A functionalist account of pain 
could - broadly speaking - consist of the following. The role of pain is characterized by the 
relationship of input and output, which we could also consider action on an individual organism 
and that organism's response. The occupant of pain is the sensorimotor system of the organism 
itself. It is the organism's state of being in pain that causes the behaviour of various kinds of 
expressions such as yelping, linguistic statements such as "That really hurt, you bastard," and 
avoidance behaviour in the future regarding the physical event that put the organism in pain in 
the first place. 
Functionalist parlance discusses the function of a particular physical state of that organism 
such as being in pain, where we have discussed the concept of an organism's sensorimotor 
activity. The occupant of this role - the physical material which carries out these actions - would 
be the neural networks of the brain and sensorimotor system. To understand the whole 
phenomenon of the action of an organism, one would need to understand the roles and the 
occupants. In our example, this would be the pain behaviour and the neural systems that act in 
the manner of pain behaviour. Reliance on the parlance of the mental in functionalism results in 
some ambiguity about the precise nature of that which is typically called mental. The activities -
or rather, functions- that define the mental for this philosophy are not simply the behaviours of 
an organism that are observed in daily life. Behaviour may be completely different while the role 
- or rather the activity of the physical occupant - may still be that of pain. Take Hilary Putnam's 
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essay "Brains and Behaviour," where he imagined the existence of a person w o would be in 
incredible pain, yet possess such self-discipline that he would not show it.20 This person would 
undergo all the neuroelectrical activities of pain, but his behaviour would not demonstrate it. The 
occupant in Putnam's example is just another person like you or I, but the role of the behaviour 
associated with pain would be remarkably different from what we are typicall used to. The 
particular neuroelectrical activity that constitutes the sensation of pain may also vary from 
incident to incident. 
One important aspect of functionalism, which also offers an interesting parallel with 
neurophilosophy, is that the organic brain is not the only thing that can carry out these activities. 
Functionalism takes the activities of mind to be realizable in multiple substances, the number of 
which is limited only by the capabilities of the substance involved and the ingenuity of the 
builders of artificial brains. We saw in our earlier treatment of the Churchlands' philosophy that 
many particular aspects of their insights about the human brain were drawn from their analysis of 
artificial neural networks. A neural network can be constructed from material other than that of 
an organism like those we find on Earth. This is a key tenet of functionalism as well, since the 
functional term of- to take once again an often used example21 - being in pain can apply to any 
object with similar physical structures, which could likely express similar behaviours of yelps, 
expletives, and future aversion behaviour. A functionalist account has the same roles able to be 
enacted by a variety of different occupants and arrangements of occupants.22 
Giving credence to a functionalist account of phenomena is to say that formal roles are 
20 Putnam, Hilary. "Brains and Behaviour." Philosophy of Mind: A Guide and Anthology. Pp. 102-4. (2004 
Orig. 1965) Putnam speculates about hypothetical people he calls super-Spartans who can go through 
tremendous physical torture without expressing pain, but there is no need to invent a fictional example of 
such individuals. Real people do this every day, usually connected with religious rituals, as in acts of self-
flagellation during certain Shi'ite festivals, or Buddhist monks demonstrating indifference to physical ity. 
21 Block, Ned. "What Is Functionalism?" Kim, Jaegwon. "Mental Content," "Multiple Realization and the 
Metaphysics of Reduction;" Putnam, Hilary. "Psychological Predicates;" all included in Philosophy of Mind: A 
Guide and Anthology. 
" Fodor, Jerry. "The Mind-Body Problem." Philosophy of Mind: A Guide and Anthology. Pp. 1 73-6. (2004 
Orig. 1980) 
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important to explanations of an event, just as important as the individual object which carries out 
that role. Central to functionalism is the distinction between talk of roles and talk of occupants -
each has its own specific and distinct context of relevance. When we say that roles are important 
in explanation, we admit that functional understanding does not necessarily take noun words 
like 'belief and 'desire' as positing that beliefs and desires are physical things, as Paul Churchland 
denigrated all talk of beliefs and desires for doing. Beliefs and desires, for functionalism, are the 
activities of believing and desiring. The words 'belief and 'desire' refer to the roles those activities 
play in social discourse. Though the Churchlands set their neurophilosophy in opposition to 
functionalism, 23 this account of functionalist philosophy is able to encompass talk of neural 
activity as an element of the overall description of an individual's activity - talk of neural activity 
is talk of the occupants. The functionalist account of pain would also include talk of the mental 
state of being in pain, in the context of being the causal role. Considered in this sense, we can see 
a functionalist approach to an organism's life in the world taking talk of mental states as being 
valid, but as a general description of an event. 
Functionalism speaks of mental predicates in terms of causal efficacy. A belief, or any 
kind of what functionalist parlance would call a 'mental state,' is to be define in terms of its 
causal role, or causative activity, in the actions of an individual organism. I eat the chocolate 
square because I like the taste of chocolate and its mild pleasurable effect. Thi 'liking' is a mental 
state, a role filled by certain neuroelectrical activities, which is a direct cause of my eating this 
particular chocolate square with my lunch as I see it in its box in my kitchen cupboard. The 
functionalist account here has recast my belief as a mental state having direct causal relation with 
the patterns of my behaviour. But observe what it has conserved, left untransformed- the typical 
colloquial language ofbeliefs and desires. The vocabulary set that the Churchlands would call folk 
psychology- positing the existence of beliefs and desires and so on in the special ontology of the 
" Churchland, Paul M. "Eliminative Materialism and the Propositional Attitudes." Philosophy of Mind: A 
Guide and Anthology. Pp. 382-400. Heil, John; ed. Oxford University Press. (2004 Orig. 1981) 
Page 29 
mental state- is retained. Ned Block's essay "What Is Functionalism?" gives a account of how 
colloquial language of mental states is represented in logical notation - how talk of mental states 
is given logical consistency as a formulation of objective propositions.24 A complete description of 
a human action would be to describe both the action as the body physically and observably carried 
it out, as well as the mental activities that were the causal conditions of that action. A key 
element of the causes of an organism's action is the organism's mental state- the process of 
making a decision. No directed action would be possible for an organism were it not for the 
function of thinking.25 Had I not been able to think, I would not have reached for the chocolate 
square this morning, or indeed done any activity that one could call conscious activity. The 
existence of mental states is the condition for the possibility of intentional human action. 
In a sense, the Churchlands would agree that an organism thinks. Their difference with 
functionalist philosophy is a difference in language, as the Churchlands reject talk of the mental 
as confusing and unnecessary. They hold that the activities of thinking, perceiving, and so on can 
be better explained with neurological rather than mentalist vocabulary. The functionalist concept 
of the 'mental state' is central in the explanation of the role thinking plays in behaviour, and the 
Churchlands claim that this term implies that there is a thing called a 'mental state' that exists 
over and above the activities of the physical sensorimotor system of neuroelectrical signals. A 
bridge between neurophilosophical and functionalist perspectives can be found in the work of 
Jaegwon Kim, particularly in his book, Physicalism Or Something Near Enough.26 While Kim's 
work does not focus quite so heavily on neurological accounts of thought and action, he generally 
endorses a reductive account of mentality. Kim's recent work does not menti n the Churchlands 
in any significant sense, but he ultimately aims at an account of the human organism that is a 
matter of describing physical things and activities that constitute the organism. Kim's book sets 
24 Block, Ned. "What Is Functionalism?" Pp. 194-7. 
25 I do not take reflex action to be an example of d irected action. The importance of my focus directed 
action will be better understood in the context of chapter three. 
26 Kim, Jaegwon. Physicalism, Or Something Near Enough. Princeton University Press. (2005) 
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this problem in a context of how the role-occupant relationship works in the philosophy of 
science that further elucidates the central concept of our inquiry - that of min understood as 
activity. 
2. The Strengths and Weaknesses of Functionalism 
The reason Kim's functionalist physicalism is important to my inquiry is because his 
philosophy, especially as explicated in his Physicalism, states the problem that functionalist 
language faces when attempting to account for the nature of the qualia of con ciousness. I said in 
the introduction to this thesis that a non-reductive physicalist philosophy of mind must stand 
consistently against reductionism (and its more aggressive cousin, eliminativi m) and account for 
the qualia of consciousness. This section will first situate Kim's work relative t the Churchlands, 
conceptually. There follows an explication of Kim's functionalism, ending wit the qualia 
question, which is a stumbling block for him. The purpose of this section is to point out that while 
the Churchlands embrace reductionism but have an interesting answer to the qualia question, 
Kim blatantly embraces physicalism without being openly reductionist. Yet he does not offer a 
final solution to the question of whether one can build a non-reductive physicalism because he 
falters by giving up on how to incorporate qualia into his philosophy of mind. This failure points 
to Kim's own more subtle, perhaps unintended, reductionism. 
Recall the previous discussion of Paul Churchland' s "Eliminative Materialism and the 
Propositional Attitudes." That manifesto took there to be certain ontological assumptions built 
into our colloquial talk about beliefs and desires as the motive of human action. Our account of 
human action revolves around words that describe thoughts and beliefs and ascribes them as the 
key motivators of an organism's act. The Churchlands' neurophilosophical project was to examine 
the discoveries of neurology in their full ontological implications in the following manner. 
Instead of some thing in the brain that could be plainly identified as a belief, what is actually 
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present to the investigator of the brain is a complex mechanism of pattern formation in the 
neuroelectrical system. It is these highly complex interdependent and interlocking patterns of 
activity that are our beliefs, desires, imaginings, experiences, and so on. Mental entities do not 
exist in some directly one-to-one relation between our linguistic statements a dour brain-states. 
From the perspective of our understanding of neurophilosophy, an organism's linguistic assertion 
such as "I would like to eat an ice cream" is the end product of a long and complex pattern of 
neuroelectrical activity encoded through a network of neural networks. The brain synthesizes a 
wide variety of experiences into an interweaving series of neural patterns stretching throughout 
the wild yet ordered jungle of neuroelectrical architecture that is the brain. The prevalence of 
these simple linguistic constructions in the very composition of our common speech is, for the 
Churchlands, a source of considerable deception about the true nature of thinking. That there are 
such existent things as thoughts, as run the posits of folk psychology, is an elaborate lie, built up 
for the sake of simple communication and ignorance of the inner workings of the organism. 
The Churchlands describe folk psychology as a systematized way of considering the 
standard mode of human communication -language. Here is what the Churchlands take folk 
psychology to be. If we take every word of colloquial language to be a direct ntological posit - a 
statement that every word in a sentence refers either directly or indirectly to orne existing thing 
- then we have in every language a system of predicting and explaining the actions of speaking 
organisms and the dynamics of their motivating factors. They instead see the true nature of 
intelligent life as laid before us in the study of neurology. This is why the "Eliminative 
Materialism" essay ends with images that are the trappings of Philip K. Dick rather than Gottlob 
Frege - people learning to speak languages with words composed of mathematical representations 
of neural vector coding, or being implanted with direct brain-to-brain transceivers converting 
neuroelectrical signals into electromagnetic wave patterns and back again just as cellular phones 
do with sounds. For the Churchlands, talk of mentality is useless if it refers to that which does not 
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exist. Since the central nouns of folk psychology do not refer to physically exi ting things, these 
words are useless and should be removed from all human discourse. 27 
Jaegwon Kim centres his work in a far different context, but parallels the Churchlands in 
his reductionist account of mind. Kim focusses on how the language that we use is not necessarily 
always an already-systematized predictive I explanatory system, but a means of understanding a 
world. Kim situates functional understanding of phenomena at a particular point along a 
continuum of progress from general ignorance to comprehensive understanding of phenomena. 
Mind is a central area in our science of understanding humanity where much progress along this 
continuum has yet to be made. The functional account of mind sees the language of mental 
entities - talk of beliefs, desires, and so on - as essential to our understanding f human action. 
These concepts are terms in colloquial language to understand the roles of the organism's activity. 
Kim says our functional understanding of the language of the mental makes no posits regarding 
the singular physical existence of anything of which it speaks. The purpose of functional 
understanding is to lay out the roles that the various entities enact. We can think of these roles, 
he says, as the causal structure of events - the connections between events in space and time, and 
the regularities of relations between the events described. Kim is here discussing events in general, 
which would include those events that are the actions of organisms. What he c lls physical 
understanding is the understanding of what exactly these events are and what entities exist that 
constitute the events- the occupants of the roles. The physical account does not replace the 
functional, or render it redundant, or childish, or silly. Both accounts are equally valid in their 
proper contexts. The functional account describes a process in its relations to ther processes and 
things, and in the inner relations of its composite processes and things. The physical account 
describes in great detail the physical substrates of those causal processes. The functional account is 
of what happens in terms of what roles the things involved play in relation to each other. The 
physical account is of what those things actually are. Physical understanding completes the 
27 Church land, Paul M. "Eliminative Materialism and the Propositional Attitudes." Pp. 39 7-9. 
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theoretical picture of which the functional understanding was the general sketch. Kim describes 
functional as describing the broad details of the world, while we would take the physical in the 
context of Kim's work as a description so wide-ranging and accurate as to be microscopic and 
cosmological in scope. I will illustrate this difference by Kim's own examples. 
Kim uses examples from the history of science to illustrate this point, which clarifies how 
he uses one of the most controversial words in the philosophy of mind - reduction. Kim's 
concept of reduction is an engagement with the question "Can we physically reduce minds? Is 
mentality reducible in physical terms?"28 To reduce minds would be to complement our 
functional understanding of mind with a physical understanding of mind? The very phrasing of 
this question itself shows the presence of the conceptual divide we saw so clearly in the work of 
David Chalmers, of the inability to reconcile the experience of life - the act of living itself - with 
the scientific account of life - what we know of what life is. Kim casts this question as a relation 
between our different ways of scientific knowing: the functional explanation, and what Kim 
terms the physical explanation or as I term it the explanation of what is really going on. We see 
his understanding of functionalism in the example of how genetic science has progressed over the 
prior 150 years. The development of genetics began as a study of heredity conducted by a monk 
named Gregor Mendel in his garden. Identifying the features of his pea plants that he could tell 
were inherited from the parent plants, he referred to these characteristics as 'genetic' factors. 
Mendel invented the term to refer simply to those features that were passed from parent 
organisms to children. 
Genetic factors were to be whatever mechanisms or processes in organisms were causally 
responsible for the transmission of heritable characteristics. In short, the concept of a gene 
is defined in terms of a causal function, or causal role - in terms, that is, of the causal task 
that must be performed by whatever it is that is to qualify as a gene. As we will say, the 
concept of a gene is a 'functional' concept, and the property of being a gene is a 
" Kim, Jaegwon. Physicalism, Or Something Near Enough. Pg. 161. 
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functional property defined by a 'job description.'29 
When we are dealing with a concept that is defined solely in this functional manner, the structure 
of our own understanding of the concept itself constrains how that concept is treated. In this 
early stage of genetic science that Kim describes, one could ask the question, 'What is a gene?' 
And the answer would be, 'That which transmits heritable characteristics from parent to child.' 
Before we know what a gene is beyond this description of its role in the activity of parent-child 
inheritance, we remain puzzled as to further questions of what a gene really is in a physical sense. 
We must still work out what physically exists that carries out these activities. The object is in 
functional understanding defined solely by its activity, while that which does the activity is itself 
still invisible to us; so we only know of its function, not its physical composition. Before the 
discovery and analysis of the DNA molecule, we could imagine heredity as carried out by any of a 
number ofbiological entities, or even several biological entities coming together to act in some 
systemic tandem. 30 However, we are now aware of the precise things which are responsible for 
heredity in organisms - DNA molecules existing in the cellular structure. Our knowledge of the 
process of organism heredity has changed from the functional to the physical. Where we once 
only knew of a series of actions, we now know the precise things in the world that carry out these 
actions. This is a transition of understanding from the functional to the physical, and it is a 
profound shift. 
What has shifted is not the process itself, but our own understanding of that process. 
Inheritance had taken place long before there were organisms who were capable of understanding 
it, and their explanations grew more detailed, making the transition from having a functional 
character to a physical character - from describing activities to describing the things that carry out 
29 Kim, Jaegwon. Physicalism, Or Something Near Enough. Pg. 163. 
'
0 Thompson, Evan. Mind In Life: Biology, Phenomenology, and the Sciences of the Mind . Pg. 187-94. 
Harvard University Press. (2007) Recent studies indicate that this may be the case, as new research 
indicates that the DNA molecule does not act alone to implement inherited traits in an organism, but in 
tandem with a variety of biological entities and processes. In addition, the traditiona l conception of an 
organism's genome as functioning in a manner of one gene corresponding to one trait is now 
thoroughly discredited in mainstream biology. 
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those activities. Common to all accounts of the world is that events and relations which occur 
with regularity are organized into a systematic series of interrelated patterns. The fact of the 
matter is that which is the case, and one can say our account of the world is more successful as it 
approaches that which is the case - because one builds an account of the world with the purpose of 
figuring out what is really going on. An account of the world is a perspective n the world, but a 
perspective that is articulated in the context of a community of accounts and account-givers. The 
process of giving an account of the world is premised on the formulator of that account 
intending the account she is given to be as accurate as she is able to make it. This is why a physical 
explanation, according to Kim, would be an improvement on a explanation of some element of 
the world that was functional only. 
Kim understands reduction not as eliminating some facet of our knowledge because it is 
redundant. Instead, the movement of 'reduction' that he describes expands and augments our 
knowledge. Kim does not intend to say that all psychology will eventually revolve only around 
physical explanations of thinking, which on the Churchlands' account are neurological 
explanations. To say that physical knowledge improves our account is to say that it augments and 
widens our understanding of the process of thinking. The case Kim builds here is not to invalidate 
the functional with the physical -that is eliminativism, the extreme of reduction. Kim's analysis 
understands the relation of the functional and the physical as complements to each other. Just as 
the scientific investigations of the 1950s and 60s into molecular genetics and DNA served as the 
beginning of the physical account of the process of heredity, the contemporary neurological 
investigations are beginning a physical account of the activity of thinking and perceiving. 
Kim's aim is just as the title of his book states, to build a philosophy of the mind that is a 
physicalism, or at least close enough to physicalism as one can get. This goal i a clear result of 
Kim's concept of what it is to give an account, to articulate an explanation. The best accounts are 
those that can encapsulate the whole of the phenomenon that interests us, not just one part of it 
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- the fully comprehensive explanation. Functional accounts of a particular ph nomenon are 
useful in certain contexts, or when the physical composition of the interesting phenomenon 
remains unknown. But Kim ultimately takes these causal accounts to be too vague, and for the 
context of science, he takes the better explanation to be the physical one, because he says 
scientific inquiry looks for the most comprehensive explanation. And the functional explanation 
is the explanation of the role alone, when a complete account of the phenome on in question is 
of the role and the occupant. The occupant Kim says is physical, but the concept of physical is, in 
Kim's account, that which is potentially explicable. A central tenet of his physicalism is that all 
which exists is physical, and all that is physical is explicable. Yet there is one element of his 
account of mind in Physicalism that remains a puzzle for him - the question of qualia. 
Even so, he remains optimistic about the investigation into the nature of consciousness, 
laying out his own investigation in opposition to the pessimistic "mysterians"3 1 about the 
problematic of what exactly the mind is. Nor is his concept of reduction eliminative. The causal 
concepts and so-called folk psychological terms are not to be deemed irrelevant and eliminated, 
as Paul Churchland advocated at the end of his manifesto. Yet the precise aspect of mind that 
Kim cannot account for in his physicalism is the matter of the qualia of experience. He ultimately 
concludes that the qualia of experience are irreducible to any physical correlate, considering qualia 
an ineffable aspect of experiential life. Kim says there is no way a physicalist can account for 
qualia.32 He approaches the qualia problematic in terms of what he calls an "e gineering project." 
Presumably, once one has a comprehensive physical understanding of a system, says Kim, then 
one would at least know how to build one of your own - providing economic and logistical 
concerns were not an issue. The project is to build a machine that 
responds to punctures and abrasions to its own skin ('tissue damage') by taking evasive 
11 Searle, John. Mind: A Brief Introduction . Pp. 1 02 -3. Oxford University Press. (2004) Kim describes and 
Searle names a group of philosophers of mind who consider understanding the nature of consciousness 
to be too difficult a task for humans possibly to succeed. 
" Kim, Jaegwon. Physicalism, Or Something Near Enough. Pg. 170. 
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manoevers to separate itself from the source of the damage ('escape behaviour'); in 
addition, we are told to make this device experience pain when it suffers damage to its 
skin. That is, we are asked to design into the machine a 'pain box' which, in addition to its 
causal work of triggering an appropriate motor response when it suffers damage, gives rise 
to a pain experience. We can, I am sure, easily design into a machine a device that will 
serve as a causal intermediary between the physical input and the behaviour output, but 
making it experience pain is a totally different affair. I don't think we even know where 
to begin.33 
The functions that the organism carries out through its experience are not a problem, as they are 
easily encapsulated in the scientific understanding of the human organism that enables us to 
build a pain machine, a reading machine, a talking machine, a face recognizing machine, an 
emotion recognizing machine,34 and all other kinds of machines that can do just what we 
organisms do. The machine illustrates the role that a thing carries out in the life of an organism, 
and qualia serve no such role for the machine - so qualia serve no functional role in a life. Pain is 
a qualitative aspect of conscious experience, so is irreducible to a functional role. 
At the very end of Physicalism, he writes, 
Suppose that we have already acknowledged that a given perceiver can experience a range 
of qualia. When we present to her a ripe tomato, we may not know, and may not care, 
what the intrinsic quality other visual experience is- what colour quale he [sic] is 
experiencing. Similarly, when we present to her a bunch of spinach leaves, we may not 
know what quale characterizes her visual experience. However, we can tell whether her 
colour quale of the tomato is the same as, or different from, her colour quale of the 
spinach leaves . . . Colour-inverted persons, as long as they have the c pacity to make the 
same colour discriminations, should do as well as we do in learning about the world and 
coping with it. Intrinsic qualities of qualia are not functionalizable and therefore are 
irreducible, and hence causally impotent.35 
n Kim, Jaegwon. Physicalism, Or Something Near Enough. Pg. 168. 
" Churchland, Paul. The Engine of Reason, the Seat of the Soul. MIT Press. ( 1995) N ETtalk the talking 
machine, Pp. 84-91; the face recognizing machine, Pp. 38-42; and its variation, EMPATH, the face 
recognizing machine that can detect what emotions the face displays, Pp. 125-7. If your word processor 
has a 'find' function, it is a reading machine. 
's Kim, Jaegwon. Physicalism, Or Something Near Enough. Pp. 172-3. 
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The problem Kim explains here is that qualia themselves play no function in the life of the 
organism- only the ability to distinguish one colour from another. He calls this apparently 
irreducible feature of the human organism 'mental residue,' as he considers it impossible to 
account for the specificity of experiential qualia in the functions of an organi m. Yet he refers to 
this 'mental residue' of qualia as if qualia were supposed to be physical things, where the inquiry of 
this thesis has built an account of qualia as neuroelectrical activities, not physical things. 
Even though Kim set out to build a physicalist account of human thinking and the mind, 
he must instead settle for an account that is near enough to physicalism, as he titled his book, 
because he cannot think of a physicalist account of qualia.36 However, Kim is a clear example of a 
physicalist working in the analytic tradition of philosophy of mind who, while using the word 
'reduction,' is far from a reductionist as I defined at the beginning of this thesis. His continuum 
of functional and physical explanations is a way of understanding how we build systems of 
knowledge that encompasses both causal roles and physical occupants of those roles as being 
valid. An understanding ofboth is mutually enlightening. We can accept with Patricia and Paul 
Churchland that the aspects of human life that we typically associate with the mind are activities 
of the human physical neural apparatus. But our talk of mentality still maintains relevance in the 
functionalist sense. Kim's problem with qualia is not that he is unable, like an eliminativist, to 
make qualia disappear. His problem is that he cannot find a way to augment his understanding of 
qualia beyond the functional, so remains puzzled. Kim's reductionism manifests itself in his desire 
to bring qualia beyond the functional in this sense. He could not do so in his own system, but the 
Churchlands did. So we now have before us two philosophies of mind. The Churchlands are 
eliminative, but can account for qualia; Kim is not eliminative, but qualia mystify him. 
,. Kim, Jaegwon. Physicalism, Or Something Near Enough. Pp. 168-73. 
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3. The Pattern of Patterns 
One general problem of physicalism is how mind can arise from mindlessness. This may 
seem a distraction from the discussion of functionalism, but its relevance will become clear. One 
commonly used analogy to answer this challenge is to say that the mind is like a car. All the 
various bits of metal, plastic, glass, and fabric strewn about in pieces is not a functioning car - we 
would say that it is a pile of junk. And that is the condition of a great deal of matter, strewn about 
in chaotic fashion, not suited to carry out any action on its own. But all this matter can be 
arranged and assembled in a very complex fashion such that a functioning car has been built. 
There is nothing inherent in the metal itself that creates controlled explosions of gasoline, and 
carries out all the other actions typical of a functioning car. The matter that was used to build the 
car could just as easily have been used to build something completely different, or nothing at all. 
It is this very particular and complicated arrangement of these particular sorts of matter such that 
certain processes are carried out, which constitutes a functioning car. And in parallel fashion, it is 
this very particular and complicated arrangement of certain sorts of matter such that certain 
processes other than those of the car are carried out, which constitutes a living organism. 
However, a car may be central to the analogy, but no one has ever said a car was the same as a 
mind.37 A car is not a mind, or an organism, but the key element of the car analogy for my 
investigation is the concept that a certain arrangement of physical things can facilitate the 
activities of perceiving, thinking, and the other relevant activities we typically associate with the 
mind. A brief analysis of David Lewis' account of the mind as a supervenient property will give us 
a further conceptual foundation to understand exactly how mind may appear from the mindless. 
Lewis has his own analogy for the nature of the mind that is much simpler than the 
example of the properly assembled car, has fewer implications of the necessity for an intelligent 
designer like the Christian God, and requires virtually no knowledge of automotive science to 
construct. It is an image of thought essential to understanding the physicalist concept of mind we 
'
7 Except in fictional stories, David Hasselhoff's car KITT from Night Rider being one example. 
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hope to establish - the image of mind as a pattern. 
Imagine a grid of a million tiny spots - pixels - each of which can be made light or dark. 
When some are light and some are dark, they form a picture, replete with interesting 
intrinsic gestalt properties .... The picture and the properties reduce to the arrangement 
of light and dark pixels. They are nothing over and above the pixels. They could go 
unmentioned in an inventory of what there is without thereby renderi g that inventory 
incomplete.38 
He describes an arrangement of dots varying in size and colour which, viewed without any special 
magnification, compose a picture. But the picture can be described using a table of what kind of 
dot exists at each physical location on the area of interest. To describe the picture itself, it is not 
necessary to describe the physical state of the materials of the picture. What is physically present is 
only the pixels themselves, but it is the arrangement of the pixels that constitutes the picture. The 
picture is the totality of the pixels in their arrangement - as such, we can say that the picture 
supervenes on the pixels. The picture is present insofar as it is present to the organism, because it 
is only in the interpretation of the pattern of pixels that the picture itself is seen. The pattern of 
pixels, says Lewis, exists as a picture insofar as one perceives the pattern as a picture. 
Similarly as the picture supervenes on the pixels, says Lewis, the mind supervenes on the 
body and its actions. But supervenience is not the concept I want to say is most important in our 
understanding of mind. Nor is the concept of a pattern that has to be interpreted from a physical 
arrangement by another interpreter. The term supervenience implies that mind consists in 
properties that, while dependent on the physical activities of the organism's sensorimotor system, 
remain somehow different from those activities. The latter concept, the most direct interpretation 
of Lewis' image of the pattern, leads to an infinite regress of interpreters - a mind pattern is only 
present when it is observed by some other mind, which is also a pattern. Neither of these 
interpretations are what I want to take from Lewis' image of the pattern. What we call the mind 
" Lewis, David. "Reduction of Mind." Papers in Metaphysics and Epistemology. Pg. 294. Cambridge 
University Press. (1999 Orig. 1994) 
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is the pattern that we interpret from the activities of the organism as a whole, specifically 
considering the role in these activities of the organism's neural system. 
This account is strikingly similar to how the mind is treated in the context of 
neurophilosophy, and the Churchlands even refer to particular thoughts as being in fact patterns 
of neuroelectrical activity. Lewis' supervenience account understands the mi d as a meaningful 
pattern of activity whose meaning is only visible to us as its activity unfolds before us. For Lewis, 
mind is a pattern that is only perceivable as an organism living and behaving in the world - what 
we typically think of as mind is the pattern we interpret from the manifold of the activities of 
life. If we doubt that a thing thinks and perceives, we judge by an analysis of how that thing acts 
- whether it exhibits a pattern of activity in the world associated with those things which we know 
think. This is how one would satisfy one's skepticism that a given organism i probably thinking. 
The behavioural activities of an organism - its particular activities in the world - constitute the 
thinking of that organism just as much as the neuroelectrical activity. This was mentioned in my 
earlier39 account of Patricia Churchland' s treatment of the organism seeing a plum and grabbing 
it off the tree. 
Not only that, but the Churchlands' account of the neuroelectrical activity that is part of 
the activity of perception and motion allows us to understand activity associated with mind as 
more than just behaviour observable to others. The behavioural activity which, for Lewis, displays 
mind is also - and essentially- neural activity that is physically inside the organism in question. 
Mind is no separate thing over and above our activities of perceiving and moving, but is our 
activity itself considered in the totality of that activity. The act of interpretation itself is one of 
those activities of an organism that we think of as being proper to mind. Thinking itself - mental 
action - is a matter of patterns of activity, and we can see this in the neurophilosophical account 
as well. Single units of neuroelectrical activity, each with a single vector mathematical value, 
constitute in their totality a complete, multilayered, hyperdimensionally interpreted pattern that 
'
9 ln Chapter One, §2. 
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is the network of all neural networks in an organism. This is what we colloquially call 'mind.' 
If mind is constituted in the activities of perception and motion, then one cannot 
consider mind as wholly inner or wholly outer - in the physicalist context, neither a strong 
privilege to the neurological dimension or a strong behaviourism. The pattern of neural activity 
are created in the brain of an organism based on the interaction of the organism with and in its 
world, continually shifting with the activity of worldly perception and perception of the 
organism's own body. The network of all neural networks in an organism is it elf capable of 
generating new networks- the pattern of patterns that is itself a pattern-maker. Action in the 
world requires that the organism be aware of itself - that is, aware of its own body. One's body is 
a physical object, so awareness of one's body is awareness of one's physical existence. As such, the 
organism understands its physical presence in the world. Action in the world also requires that the 
organism be aware of its surroundings and its place in them. This awareness of the surrounding 
world is understanding the perceptions of the organism as present to the organism. This is how 
the concepts of physical presence and presence to the organism that we discussed in the previous 
chapter relate to the concept of the human person as the self-patterning pattern. 
But what exactly is the organism aware of in its awareness of its body and world, its body 
as a constituent of the world, aware of itself as a physically co-present constituent of the world? 
Self-awareness leaves us with the old problem that David Hume put forth in the 1700s, and that 
we find in the Buddhist concept of self-reflection, according to Francisco Varela. When we look 
introspectively, there are thoughts, memories, experiences, and all the fleeting presentations of 
the process of thinking- but one can find no self that thinks, no impassive cogito of bastardized 
Cartesian imagery. Hume in Europe and the Buddhist scholarly tradition in Asia are the major 
historical articulators of this problem.40 Scouring the theatre of our mind for its director is not the 
proper way to discover what this self is of which we speak when we talk of self-awareness. Such an 
•• Varela, Francisco J.; Evan Thompson; Eleanor Rosch. The Embodied Mind: Cognitive Science and Human 
Experience. Pp. 59-81. MIT Press. (1991) 
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image has implications for the introspective hunt for a mini-me at which Patricia Churchland 
pokes fun when skewering the simplistic images of non-neurological psychology.41 Lewis' image 
of the pattern has a great many parallels with the neurophilosophical account of what we typically 
call mind, insofar as the identity of the organism and all the actions we traditionally associate 
with the concept of mind are the result of the cumulative simultaneous action of a multitude of 
individual neurons which are neuroelectrically active at certain levels. The self is found not 
through an introspective search for one particular object. If we take the typically reflective path of 
ploughing through memory and examining actions, we only find memories and actions, but no 
central coordinating figure called 'self.' If we take the neurophilosophical path, we will find 
patterns of energy in neural systems, coordinated throughout the brain - however we will find no 
special coordinator, but the system of systems, the pattern of all patterns. This pattern of patterns 
itself constitutes the unity of consciousness; it is a unity in activity. 
One sticking point remains with this concept of the mind as pattern of patterns before we 
move on. We earlier said - in reference to Lewis' supervenience analogy of the picture 
constituted from an arrangement of pixels - that what is physically present - in Lewis' words, 
what is there for the inventory of what is present - are the pixels themselves. The picture itself is 
only present insofar as it is seen by a perceiver, since it is a function of the pixels' arrangement. 
Does this stand also regarding the mind and the neural activity of the brain? That is, is the mind 
not really there, but merely a function of the arrangement of neuroelectrical activity? The 
Churchlands would say this is the case, as the stance of eliminativism is that what is not physically 
present does not exist, and that its apparent existence is illusory. Lewis' preci e formulation of the 
concept lends itself to this problem. The mind is not exactly the same as an arrangement of pixels 
which forms a picture, and the mind is not exactly the same as an arrangement of metal and 
•• Churchland, Patricia. Brain-Wise: Studies in Neurophilosophy. Pg. 71. MIT Press. (2002) It is worth noting 
that Brain-Wise was published after the 1999 release of the film Austin Powers: The Spy Who Shagged Me , 
featuring Verne Troyer as the three-foot clone of the villain Dr. Evil, to whom the latter referred as 'Mini-
Me.' 
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plastic which forms a car. The image is useful to us because it is the image of the mind as a 
pattern, and our understanding of the formation of neuroelectrical patterns which constitute 
particular beliefs, thoughts, desires, and so on is captured by Lewis' image. The concept of the 
pattern as Lewis articulates it goes as follows: the image can be a pattern constituted through the 
activities of things which themselves are completely different from the patter in question. 
Particular activities of particular things may constitute patterns that had never before existed. The 
pattern may not be a single thing, but exists as it is constituted by the activities of many things. 
Considered only in a singular sense, a neuroelectrical signal is just that and nothing more. But 
because that neuroelectrical signal is one signal among many and organized in a complex 
physical sensorimotor system of an organism perceiving and moving in a world, it is one 
component element of a pattern of activity which constitutes an individual mind. No director-
figure is needed over and above the activity itself, as the activity organizes itself in a pattern that 
constitutes the mind perceiving, moving, and acting in the world. The pattern is itself 
constituted in activity, and this is not just neuroelectrical activity, but also the activity of an 
organism's worldly behaviour. That is, in constituting the mind, the pattern constitutes the living 
organism itself. 
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III. Bodily Life, A Life 
The central concept of this thesis is that the mind of an individual is constituted in the activities 
of perception and motion. This chapter will aim at deepening the understanding of this 
constitutive activity of perceiving itself, specifically how the activity of perception affects the 
relationship of the individual to its surroundings. In the language of Maurice Merleau-Ponty, we 
could also describe this as the relationship of the individual to its world. The most important 
textual sources for this inquiry will be Merleau-Ponty's Phenomenology of Perception, and Evan 
Thompson's Mind in Life. The latter is Thompson's summary of many years of his own work, 
much of which was in collaboration with Francisco Varela. Thompson and Varela considered their 
work to be an extension of Merleau-Ponty's, and much of Mind in Life is spe t examining 
Merleau-Ponty's own concepts, along with how those concepts apply to Thompson's own 
thinking on the nature of the organism. 
The first section of this chapter situates Merleau-Ponty and the phenomenological 
tradition of which he was a leading figure in the context of my current inquiry, particularly the 
debate over the relative validity of subjective and objective perspectives. It is a central point of 
Merleau-Ponty's thinking that one should not eliminate subjectivity or objectivity from 
philosophy, but that one should understand how a perspective is constituted. The second section 
examines Merleau-Ponty' s account of that constitution, focussing on his concept of 'bodily life,' 
his term for how the activities of perception and motion of a body in the world constitute the 
thoughts, personality, identity, and surroundings of an individual. Working i an entirely 
different philosophical tradition several decades before Lewis, Kim, or the Churchlands, Merleau-
Ponty came to a similar understanding of constitutive activity that I identified as present in these 
works of philosophy of mind. The Churchlands focussed on how perceiving activity constitutes 
mind as brain activity. Merleau-Ponty's work allows us to understand that co stitutive activity as 
the constitution of the world as it is present to the organism, the world of an individual 
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organism's action. Yet Merleau-Ponty' s description of the constitutive activity of perception is 
neutral on the question of substance - that is, physicalism vs dualism. So it is possible to interpret 
his phenomenological approach as representationalist if one understands Merleau-Ponty as saying 
that perception constitutes an inner world of mind and thought in contrast to the mindless outer 
world. This, however, is not the interpretation I will offer of Merleau-Ponty's work, as I 
understand him as describing an individual's activity of perception in that individual's life in the 
physical world. The third section of this chapter will use Thorn pson and Varela's analysis to 
examine the ramifications of the concept of mind constituted through the activity of perception 
articulated as a physicalism. These ramifications include new possibilities for the understanding of 
how mind is articulated in organic life in general. 
1. The Scientific Approach to Life- Escaping Situatedness 
Patricia and Paul Churchland's neurophilosophical project attempted to understand how it 
is physically possible that one forms what they deemed to be the illusions of subjectivity- how 
one comes to the conclusion that beliefs etc. exist as things, when there is physically present only 
the neural activity of believing etc.42 But organisms perceive and move in the world in such a way 
as to constitute through this perceptual and motive activity a subjective perspective. The goal of 
phenomenological philosophy as I shall examine here is not to elucidate further the view of the 
world as an impassive topography or to enumerate the inventory of the world. It is to understand 
the interdependence of the personal perspective and the world in which it lives. The perspective of 
the individual does not detach itself completely from the world, as in what we earlier described as 
pure objectivity. Nor does the individual perspective distort what should be the correct vision of 
42 All thinking is neuroelectrical activity, but the Churchlands take this statement reductively- that what we 
have always considered thinking is really neuroelectrical activity, so we should speak only of such activity 
and not use the term 'thinking.' I take this concept as meaning that to ta ke thinking as neuroelectrical 
activity is to broaden one's general understanding of what the activity of thinking is. A description of the 
neuroelectrical activity in question describes the activity of thinking without making the leap to say that 
thinking itself is an illusion. I have always thought, and continue to think - now I better understand what 
thinking physically is. 
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the world by its very action in that world, which was the heart of the Churchla ds' hostility to 
subjectivity. The individual - perspective included - is itself a part of the world that is constituted 
in its living experience. It is important to notice here the similarity of this concept articulated in 
this understanding of phenomenological philosophy to the concept we developed in the previous 
chapter of the mind as a self-constituting pattern of activity of an organism. We saw this concept 
of the self-patterning pattern as the structure of the mind in the con text of our analysis of Kim 
and Lewis. And we saw this concept in the structure of the brain when applied to the 
Churchlands. We will see it as the structure ofthe individual in Merleau-Ponty's philosophy. And 
as we consider Thompson's philosophy, we will understand this self-constituti g activity as the 
structure of a mind articulated in the activity of living. 
The perspective that Merleau-Ponty's philosophy- his philosophy of phenomenology -
affords us on our central concept of the self-constituting pattern of activity is to elucidate this 
through the analysis of the individual's engagement with the world, analysing how the individual 
is situated. Phenomenological philosophy does not offer us a polar opposite to the absolute 
privilege that the Churchlands grant to the perspective of pure objectivity. Phenomenology does 
not privilege pure subjectivity as the only means of accessing what is real without distortion, as 
some have accused Husserl's philosophy and works inspired by it.43 Merleau-Ponty is clear that 
phenomenology grants no such privilege to pure subjectivity in his preface to The 
Phenomenology of Perception. The philosophy of phenomenology is one's un erstanding that: 
I cannot conceive of myself as nothing but a bit of the world, a mere object of biological, 
psychological or sociological investigation. I cannot shut myself up in the realm of 
science. All my knowledge of the world, even my scientific knowledge, is gained from my 
own particular point of view, or from some experience of the world without which the 
symbols of science would be meaningless ... Scientific points of view, according to which 
" Flynn, Bernard. "Maurice Merleau-Ponty." The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Edward N . Zalta, 
ed. (Summer 2004) <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2004/entries/ merleau-ponty/> The article 
notes Husserl's influence on Merleau-Ponty, and mentions that there is a prevalent interpretation in the 
scholarly literature that Husserl's phenomenological reduction is a means of accessing absolute truth 
through pure subjecitivty. 
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my existence is a moment of the world's, are always both naive and at the same time 
dishonest, because they take for granted, without explicitly mentioning, it, the other 
point of view, namely that of consciousness, through which from the outset a world forms 
itself round me and begins to exist for me.44 
Compare the above quotation with the character of the neurophilosophical description of 
humanity the Churchlands put forward. Merleau-Ponty does not deny the validity of the 
scientific description of humanity- the scientific in this context being the view from the purely 
objective perspective, as we have characterized it earlier. He instead says that the purely objective 
perspective cannot encompass all the possibilities of an individual's activity. Pure objectivity is 
one perspective among many possible ones, as can be situated along the continuum of objectivity 
and subjectivity discussed in chapter two. All possible perspectives along this continuum present 
us with the world in different ways. 
Merleau-Ponty's own philosophical investigation begins with the problem of how one 
finds oneself in the world, investigating the how the individual constitutes its existence through 
its own activity. He places this as first in his investigation, as he says above, because the existence 
of any individuals at all is the condition for the possibility of the existence of ny perspectives at 
all. That which is valid from an impassive viewpoint constitutes the conceptual boundary of the 
objective perspective. To understand the world from such an objective perspective would be to 
take inventory of that which is physically present. The boundary of the subjective perspective can 
- broadly speaking - be constituted by that which is valid as it is present to the organism or 
present to the individual. But any perspective is constituted by an individual's act of 
understanding the world of which it is a part. Whether my perspective approaches pure 
subjectivity, or pure objectivity, or some complex blend of the two general orientations, it is 
always my perspective - my point of view of the world through which and as which I live in the 
world and make sense of the world. Neither a purely subjective nor a purely objective mode of 
"Merleau-Ponty, Maurice. The Phenomenology of Perception . Pg. ix. Colin Smith, trans. Routledge Press. 
(1962. Orig. 1945) Italics mine. 
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understanding the world should be allowed to dominate one's understanding to the exclusion of 
all other perspectives as being valid. Perspective varies in many complex ways, such that pure 
examples of subjectivity or objectivity can rarely - if ever - be achieved. 45 The rest of this thesis 
will deal with how Merleau-Ponty's engagement with the constitutive activity of the individual 
can be used to deepen the understanding of the concept of mind as activity as it exists in the 
context of analytic philosophy. In The Phenomenology of Perception Merleau-Ponty explicitly 
explores the concept of activity which constitutes a pattern. 
2. The Individual Living in the World 
How can Merleau-Ponty's philosophy be compatible with physicalism? Throughout The 
Phenomenology of Perception, he makes no mention of substance. It is an examination of what it 
is to perceive, and the conditions that a thing would have to satisfy to be a perceiving individual. 
He examines the activity of perceiving. Although he works in a different philosophical tradition, 
Merleau-Ponty' s phenomenological investigation and the philosophies of the analytic tradition I 
examined earlier find common ground in the concept of the self-constituting pattern of activity. 
In the analytic context, this pattern of activity constituted mind; and in the phenomenological 
context, this pattern of activity constituted the individual in the world. I will show that these two 
concepts - the mind, and the individual in the world - while differing in the p ilosophical 
context in which they are articulated, are actually quite similar. In The Phenomenology of 
Perception one finds a description of the activity of perceiving, along with the actions that 
depend upon perception as a condition for their possibility. These actions con titute the whole of 
human living, and as such can be considered as the activities of an individual living in the world 
as a part of the world. Evan Thompson shapes Merleau-Ponty's work into a physicalist context by 
taking the individual in question in Merleau-Ponty's work to be the human organism. Charting 
this movement will be the course of the following two sections. 
'
5 Nagel, Thomas. The View From Nowhere. Pp. 25-7. Oxford University Press. (1986) 
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To begin, we should establish the difference between knowing the world as only an 
objective matter of fact, as opposed to knowing the world as a matter of activity constituting a 
relationship of perceiver and perceived. Edmund Husserl gives this example. 
A man born deaf knows that there are sounds, that sounds produce harmonies and that a 
splendid art depends upon them. But he cannot understand how sounds do this, how 
musical compositions are possible. Such things he cannot imagine, i.e. he cannot 'see' and 
in 'seeing' grasp the 'how' of such things. His knowledge about what exists helps him in 
no way, and it would be absurd if he were to try to deduce the how of music from his 
knowledge, thinking that thereby he could achieve clarity about the p ssibility of music 
through conclusions drawn from things of which he is cognizant ... 'Seeing' does not 
lend itself to demonstration or deduction.46 
The deaf man's knowledge of sounds in this example is an understanding of what sound is. 
According to Jaegwon Kim's naturalism, we could say the deaf man understa ds the physical 
nature of sound. He understands what the air movements and the structure of the aural sensory 
organ are- what Husserl would here call the 'what' of sound. But he is unable to have any 
qualitative experience of sound, because the parts of his sensory apparatus that detect sound are 
non-functional. He understands sound in its abstract sense only, as the vibration of gaseous 
molecules in an ordered fashion such that those who can detect this vibration can understand 
their meanings. The deaf man is unable to translate- in the sense of sensorimotor translative 
perception I described in chapter one - the vibration of gaseous molecules into a pattern of 
neuroelectrical activity. In other words, he is unable to hear. This would appear to undermine the 
point I made earlier, regarding regarding the idea that qualia are irreducible. But Kim thought 
qualia irreducible in that it was impossible to understand qualia as an effect of some more 
fundamental underlying physical process.47 This is the reductionist element of Kim's philosophy I 
46 Husserl, Edmund. "Lecture Two: The Critique of Cognition." The Ideo of Phenomenology. Pp. 30-1 . The 
term 'seeing' here we can take to mean 'perceiving' to avoid confusion over multiple meanings of the 
word 'see.' A blind man can still perceive the road down which he walks through the direct physical 
contact of the ground with his body - his sense of touch. 
47 Kim, Joegwon. Physicalism, Or Something Near Enough. Pp. 165-7. Pri nceton University Press. (2005) 
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identified in chapter two. But Husserl's deaf man knows what audio qualia are- he understands 
those parts of the human organism's physical sensorimotor system that detects vibration of air. It 
is just that his own sensorimotor apparatus cannot itself process audio; he fails to constitute sound 
qualia. 
Husser! in this example points out that perception in experience and t e abstract 
cognition of an object or a type of object are different activities, and one is not reducible to the 
other. To perceive is to engage in the world of which you are an active part such that what 
surrounds one is- recalling the framework I explained in chapter one of how to understand the 
relation of oneself as an individual to what exists - present to the organism. Scientific 
understanding is to consider the world and your own individual existence as an element in a 
system of things related to each other in how they are physically present to each other. A thing is 
physically present in the sense that it exists. A thing is present to the organism in the sense that it 
exists with that which perceives it, and it is an object to which a perceiving individual may direct 
its action. 
Any thing's action is a thing's alteration of itself, a thing changing its state in the world. 
As such, action is always directed in a world, and is an engagement with the world. The 
examination of this idea of engagement is how The Phenomenology of Percep tion fits with the 
current discussion on the nature of mind as a pattern of activity. Among Merleau-Ponty's goals 
in this work is elucidating his concept of the lived body - the concept of life as a body that is in a 
world and part of that world. Merleau-Ponty's concept of bodily life is that a life and a world are 
inseparable, and that in any context, the individual's understanding of its own body is always and 
inextricably linked to the individual's understanding of the world in which it lives.48 Even the 
degree to which the world and the body are considered as different ontologically from each other 
depends on the specific character of the individual's activity at the time. In one context of 
activity in the world, the individual can act without any sense of self, as in a tate of intense 
48 Dillon, M. C. Merleau-Ponty's Ontology. Pp. 130-2. Indiana University Press. ( 1988) 
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personal ecstasy or an adrenaline-fuelled state. In another context, the individual feels utterly 
alienated from the world and entirely self-centred in his thinking, such as when one refuses to 
accept the validity of any events in the world under the possibility that one's whole experience 
could be a malicious hallucination.49 In a certain context of action, a physical thing that is 
separate from the boundary of the physical organism can come to be treated as part of one's 
body, like a blind man's walking cane- the blind man perceives the world as it is laid out spatially 
before him through this extension of his sense of touch as the cane becomes an extension of his 
tactile sensory system. 
Merleau-Ponty finds another example of the blurring of the body's boundaries of action 
in driving a car. The best driver does not look at the space between the end of a line of other cars 
stopped at a red light and the right-turning lane towards which she aims, and then measures 
carefully that opening compared to the width of the car. Upon seeing the space between the car 
in front of her and the far right sidewalk, she knows whether or not she can fit- in the activity of 
driving, says Merleau-Ponty, her own lived body is that of the car, and the space in which it 
moves is her own bodily space. Through our action, we transform the very character of space 
itself. 5° Some qualification is necessary here, and the concepts I first brought pin the first 
chapter - physical presence and presence to the organism - can help. In terms of physically 
present things moving around each other, the relations among those things are altered by their 
movements relative to each other. But moving among things and incorporating things that are 
not one's physical body into one's bodily movement - such as the driver of the car acting as the 
car in Merleau-Ponty's example- is activity that constitutes the world as it is present to the 
organism. Merleau-Ponty calls lived space or bodily space the environment which the individual 
manipulates by perceiving that environment and moving in it. If the organism in question had 
not existed, the space which now exists as lived space would exist simply as an inventory of 
•• if this sounds familiar, an analysis of the Cartesian cogito in the light of Merleau-Ponty's own 
investigations is the subject of a lengthy and subtle chapter in The Phenomenology of Perception . 
50 Merleau-Ponty, Maurice. The Phenomenology of Perception. Pp. 164-7. 
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things. The presence of an acting individual introduces a dynamism into the world through the 
activity of the individual. Things existing as present to an organism are the objects of perceptive 
activity, and this perceptive activity cannot be present without an individual. Likewise, Merleau-
Ponty's driver must judge whether the car will fit through the space to turn onto the next street, 
so is constrained by those very objects in her perception and motion which she constitutes as 
present to the organism- present to herself. So those things which compose the individual's 
surroundings constrain the perceptive activity, and so exist as limitations on the movement of 
the organism. 
What Merleau-Ponty's analysis of action in a world shows us is that the individual 
constitutes the world in tandem with the world constituting the individual - simultaneous co-
constitution of body and world. This activity of co-constitution is the activity of perception and 
motion, the same activity which constitutes mind as well. Yet we must be careful about how we 
take this concept of bodily life as the co-constitution ofbody and world in action, especially 
regarding the character of space and the physical limits of the body in activity. Merleau-Ponty's 
analysis of the constitution of bodily space in activity has shown us that we can consider the 
world as it is in perception for the individual to be potentially unified with the body in the body's 
own activity. The blind person's cane, or the driver's car can be an extension of their body. My 
clothes are physically separate from my own body considered simply as an organism, yet they are 
potentially my expression, and a potential part of my body. That is, they are a potential part of 
my lived body, the vehicle of the individual's existence. Every part of the world, insofar as it is a 
possible element of my action, can be considered as part of my lived body. A d, opposite this, we 
can consider the actions of my individual body as central to the constitution f the world. This is 
how body and world constitute each other. While objects remain separate in the sense of their 
physical presence, they can become part of an individual insofar as the individual gives them such 
significance as she uses them. This activity of creating significance is exactly the constitution of 
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an individual- thinking, perceiving, believing- that we have taken to constitute mind. 
We must be careful not to interpret this co-constitution improperly, such that Merleau-
Ponty's analysis becomes embroiled in the problem of collapsing the boundary between body and 
world. If one does interpret the phenomenology of perception this way, one would be forced to 
separate conclusively the two perspectives on the world which are the consideration of the world 
as physical presence and the world as it is present to the organism. One scholar of the 
relationships between phenomenology and the analytic tradition, Sean Kelly, would define them 
as 'objective space' and 'egocentric space,' respectively. 5 1 But this interpretation puts too much of 
a dualist spin on Merleau-Ponty. The terms arise in Kelly's work in his exami ation of Merleau-
Ponty's analysis of space as those concepts became clear in his treatment of a severely brain-
injured man named 'Schneider' whose injury drastically impaired his abilities to move in relation 
to other objects. 52 Objective space as Kelly defines it is space as it is mapped in the perspective of 
pure objectivity- the ideal standpoint of what the Churchlands would say is objective science. 
Egocentric or bodily space is space as experienced from the perspective of the individual 
organism, where one's actions affect the character of one's bodily space. However, this strict 
segregation of space in physical presence and space in presence to the organism will not be the 
best solution to our problematic here, as this will only create another awkward dualism that would 
trap us in a position similar to Chalmers' quandary of a functionally comprehensible mind and 
incomprehensible qualia. 
It is Kelly's drastic separation of our characterizations of space that shows that this is 
precisely how we should not handle the concept of co-constitution. In terms of how any 
perspective at all is constituted, the dichotomy of subjectivity and objectivity is inadequate to 
illustrate the interdependence of all perspectives. Merleau-Ponty's concept of bodily life is an 
51 Kelly, Sean D. The Relevance of Phenomenology to the Philosophy of Language and the Mind. Pp. 77-83. 
Robert Nozick, ed. Garland Publishing. (2001) 
52 Merleau-Ponty, Maurice. The Phenomenology of Perception. Pp. 112-70. The chapter called "The 
Spatiality of One's Own Body and Motility." 
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understanding of how an individual is constituted via activity in the world. T is worldly activity 
is the activity of perceiving and moving - the activity of a sensorimotor system. The physical 
neuroelectrical system which the Churchlands take as existing from a purely objective perspective 
- that is, this neuroelectrical system as physically present - is necessary for the constitution of a 
particular subjectivity, an individual. The purely objective perspective is constituted by some 
individual already living in the world, and the process of that constitution is the removal of 
subjective elements of one's bodily life. Merleau-Ponty's concept of bodily life does illustrate this 
interdependence because of the concept's focus on the constitutive activity of the individual in 
the world. 
Accepting Merleau-Ponty's analysis of perspective as living in the world defuses the 
possibility of picking up eliminativism' s hostility towards the perspective of being situated in the 
world. We cannot help but engage with the world, because any refusal to engage that supposedly 
defines the purely objective perspective is itself an engagement. 53 The purely objective perspective 
abstracts one's situation in the world from any immersion in the world. Yet this abstraction is 
itself a mode of engaging with the world - the engagement of abstracting, holding oneself back 
from active engagement. One who seeks to stand at the purely objective perspective seeks to 
stand oriented to the world as an impassive watcher. One cannot help but orient oneself to the 
world, says Merleau-Ponty, and as such: 
All consciousness is, in some measure, perceptual consciousness. If it were possible to lay 
bare and unfold all the presuppositions in what I call my reason or my ideas at each 
moment, we should always find experiences which have not been made explicit, large-
scale contributions from past and present, a whole 'sedimentary history' which is not only 
relevant to the genesis of my thought, but which determines its significance. For an 
absolute evidence, free from any presupposition, to be possible ... It would be necessary, 
in other words, that instead of being myself, I should become purely and simply one who 
knows myself, and that the world should have ceased to exist around me in order to 
53 Merleau-Ponty, Maurice. The Phenomenology of Perception. Pp. 418-22. 
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become purely and simply an object before me. 54 
Merleau-Ponty here writes on the conditions for the possibility of any perspective at all. The 
perspective of pure objectivity, as the eliminativists have considered it, is one unattached to any 
particular individual in the world; because even though the purely objective perspective is 
developed by people who live in the world, the perspective of pure objectivity is divorced from all 
timeliness. Events in time - even the events of the development of the perspective of pure 
objectivity itself- are a matter of the inventory of what is, was, and will be physically present. He 
points out that for an individual to be able to take this inventory, that individual must develop 
the perspective of objectivity through living in the world. The perspectives of objective science or 
the arbitrator attempting a compromise of multiple opposing political viewpoints would be 
examples. None of these match the ideal of pure objectivity that the Churchlands seek for their 
own eliminativist points of view. Each of these more colloquial objectivities are developed in the 
process of an active engagement with the world. The Churchlands put forward as a non-
engagement their concept of pure objectivity, but no individual can achieve this perspective of 
pure objectivity. 
Every account of the world and of life in the world is built into an engagement in the 
world. This engagement is the constitutive activity of the sensorimotor apparatus - the activities 
of perceiving and moving. The activity of this engagement constitutes a mind if one considers 
only what goes on inside the organism, and a life if one considers the activities of perceiving and 
moving as the activities of an organism in the world. What Merleau-Ponty calls the 
presuppositions of any individual act of engagement in the world, we can call - in the context of 
this investigation - one constitutive element of the pattern that is the individual mind. Any 
perspective - including the supposedly purified perspective that is the Churchlands' picture of 
scientific cognition - is shaped by the presuppositions that are required for the conceptual 
coherence, or rather comprehensibility, of any particular act. In every act of explicitly describing 
5
' Merleau-Ponty, Maurice. The Phenomenology of Perception . Pp. 459-60. 
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some state of affairs - such as the neuroelectrical activity encoding some sensed event- there is a 
background of presuppositions and conditions for the described event which ll go to form, to use 
the phenomenological parlance, the horizon of that event. That horizon- the context in which 
the event itself and the description of the event is meaningful - is what Merleau-Ponty here calls 
the "sedimentary history" of that event, the existence of which is a condition for the event 
coming to be and for our accurate description of that event. Merleau-Ponty says, "I can 'bracket' 
my opinions or the beliefs I have acquired, but, whatever I think or decide, it is always against the 
background of what I have previously believed or done."55 No matter how much one may try to 
abstract from one's own situation in the world, all articulations of understanding are made within 
the pattern of activity constituted by one's own actions in the context of that situation. This 
overall pattern of activity constitutes the life of the individual. 
Of course, one's description of an event will vary with one's perspective. A change in 
perspective means a change in how one understands the event in question. Similarly, this 
constitutes a change in how one understands one's own act of perceiving. Let us return to our 
earlier example of the stick pressing against the fingertip. Our translative account of perception 
understands this physical sensorimotor activity as the pressure, shape, and texture of the stick 
themselves being encoded as the event itself translated into the neural system. Perception as 
translation presupposes that the organism engages the world, and is itself an element of the 
world. The neural encoding of perception translates an event that occurs outside the boundary of 
the organism, but that event is within the boundary of its life in the world, a d a possible target 
for its directed action. The translative account finds a parallel in Merleau-Ponty's own 
examination of the individual's process of perception. He describes the physical relationship of an 
individual body with a thing such that the individual's own actions are themselves intertwined 
with the thing that is the focus of that action. In physical engagement with a thing, the thing is a 
constituent of the lived world of the individual. The significance of a thing£ r the individual is 
'' Merleau-Ponty, Maurice. The Phenomenology of Perception. Pg. 460. 
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the role that the thing plays in the individual's lived world. That role is articulated in how the 
individual relates to the thing itsel£.56 The relation is between an existing thing and an existing 
individual, two things physically present at the same time. In the interaction between these two 
things - as the individual engages with the thing - there arises the thing as it is present to the 
organism. This is a new significance that is not valid for the inventory of the purely objective 
perspective that accounts only for that which is physically present. The activity of translative 
encoding is the interpretation of neural sensorimotor activity that best articulates the organism's 
direct action in the world in which it is present, and of which it is an element. 
We have seen from our first articulation of the concept of translative perception in 
chapter one that the physical apparatus of perception can be understood as the physical 
transformation of an event into a pattern of neuroelectrical activity. And we have seen from the 
above articulation of the concept of engagement that the act of a life in the world transforms the 
world through its action into a new mode of significance that had never been so before. This 
neuroelectrical pattern is the physical manifestation of the significance created by the perceiving 
that is an organism's active engagement with the world in which it lives- an engagement with 
an event transforms that event in terms of bestowing on it an additional sig ificance that it 
would not have had if it had taken place unperceived by an organism. The body-world 
relationship of mutual co-constitution earlier articulated is only problematic if we interpret this 
mutual co-constitution in either of two ways, which I will not pursue. One can understand the 
body-world relationship as an absolute privileging of pure subjectivity, which would define the 
world as wholly embodied in the acting life. And one can also understand the body-world 
relationship as an absolute privileging of pure objectivity, which would define the body as merely 
a perceiving thing in the world. 
Merleau-Ponty has identified the act of the individual forming itself in the world as the 
mutual constitution of body and world, a dynamic relation of each to the other. Body and world 
56 Merleau-Ponty, Maurice. The Phenomenology of Perception . Pp. 366-7. 
Page 59 
are dialectically related to each other in a relation where each shapes and defines the other, 
without one taking priority over the other. This dialectical dynamic relations ip of co-
constitution is the creation of a life continually transforming itself by means of its own activity. 
Through its activity in the world, the dialectical relation of organism to world creates that 
organism's "sedimentary history." Evan Thompson explains Merleau-Ponty's concept of such a 
dialectical relationship as follows: 
A dialectical relation is one in which: i) A determines B, and B determines A ... and ii) 
neither A nor B is analyzable into discrete, causally efficacious elements that stand in a 
one-to-one correspondence. Furthermore, dialectical relations are dynamic, not static. 
Hence iii) A alters B, and B alters A; iv) A is altered by B as determina t of B, and B is 
altered by A as a determinant of A; and v) it makes sense derivatively to speak of A 
making what A is via B, and B making what B is via A. Given these kinds of close 
interdependencies, A and B can also be regarded as parts of a larger global whole or 
pattern when they are dialectically related. Hence vi) what A is a part of is what B is a part 
of.S7 
The relationship of mutual constitution of body and world render the terms 'body' and 'world' no 
longer useful in this context, because each connotes an opposition to the other. Thompson's 
examination of the concept of co-constitutive activity understands life itself a defined by this 
activity, hence blurring the colloquially accepted boundaries between the concepts of mind, 
individual, and life. This new articulation of the concept oflife allows us to understand this 
dialectical relationship of body and world- and as we shall see, mind and life - not as an 
opposition, but as an interdependency. In examining this interdependency, I will show how 
Thompson's articulation of the concept of mind as a pattern of activity links the concept of mind 
with the concept of life. 
S7 Thompson, Evan. Mind In Life. Pp. 68-9. 
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3. Mind Embodied in Life 
What happens to our concept of the co-constitution of the individual in the world when 
we put it explicitly within a physicalist framework? The collaborative works of Thompson and 
Varela have this explicit intention. They share the interpretation of Merleau-Ponty's work on the 
nature of perception (and phenomenological philosophy as it was first developed by Husserlr8 
that understands one of the central projects of phenomenology as the analysis of how the 
individual directs herself towards the world, how the individual finds herself in the world. In the 
course of their own analysis of how the individual directs herself in the world, Thorn pson and 
Varela understand mind as constituted through an individual's perception and motion, the 
central concept of this thesis. Through this examination of perception and motion, they connect 
the concepts of mind and life, arguing that if mind is constituted through perception and 
motion, they must consider all organisms that perceive and move as having some kind of mind. 
The concept of significance as it relates to the self-constitutive pattern of activity is central to 
their inquiry. Thompson and Varela use the term 'significance' such that I may define it as 
follows. This definition depends on the concepts of physical presence and presence to the 
organism that I began using in chapter one. In being perceived, a thing becomes present to the 
organism, in addition to having been and still being physically present. Significance is the 
meaning for a perceiver that now comes to constitute a thing as it comes to be present to the 
organism. There are many organisms, and many such acts of constitution taking place at all 
times. This is how I will use the term through the remainder of this chapter. 
My account of how Thompson's ideas add to my project proceeds as follows. Thompson 
58 Thompson, Evan. Mind In Life. Pp. 413-6 . Though the treatment of Husserl in Embodied Mind is far 
more negative, treating him as, in Thompson's words, a "methodological solipsist," by 2007, he had 
changed his mind. Thompson earlier had interpreted the noesis-noema relationship in a strong 
representationalist manner - as the creation of an inner world mirroring the outer world which remained 
inaccessible. Upon studying portions of the Husserliana that were translated after 1993, Thompson came 
to understand phenomenology such that perception is not a mi rroring re-creation of the world inside the 
segregated mental, but is instead understood as world-directed constitutive activity. My own interpretation 
of Husser! and Merleau-Ponty in Ch.3 §2 is similar. 
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lays out his own account of perception as following Merleau-Ponty's lead. Merleau-Ponty 
described perception as events surrounding an individual which penetrate that individual's body.59 
Thompson understands perception as an activity which all organisms do, and so examines how -
in the most general sense - any individual organism perceives with an aim towards 
understanding what are the essential activities to life, those activities which an organism only 
ceases on its death. He makes use of a concept in the science of biology, autopoiesis, as defining 
all these essential activities. Autopoiesis is the chemical activity that constitut s the simplest 
organic body, the cell-like wall that can absorb surrounding chemicals to sustain the structural 
integrity of that wall. This is the kind of chemical reaction of taking in and rn etabolizing other 
chemicals as food. Thompson understands metabolism as the activity that rna es possible 
perception and motion, and it is also enabled by the perception and motion of organisms, since 
an organism perceives its surroundings and moves in its surroundings to gather food to 
metabolize. The relation of perception and motion to metabolism is dialectical, as Thompson 
describes above. 
Merleau-Ponty described perception as a physical body's act of perceiving - as a way in 
which the outside penetrates the inside. "Hardness and softness, roughness and smoothness, 
moonlight and sunlight, present themselves in our recollection, not pre-eminently as sensory 
contents, but as certain kinds of symbiosis, certain ways the outside has of invading us and 
certain ways we have of meeting this invasion."60 The fact of the boundary's existence does not 
imply an absolute separateness, a pure disconnection between the individual life and its 
surrounding world. To put the point analogically, building a fence does not put my garden in a 
different world than the surrounding forest. Perception is a kind of symbiosis between the 
surroundings, and the self-contained and self-maintaining system that is the organism. Our 
conception of the physical process of perception as translation of the event into a neural pattern 
59 Merleau-Ponty, Maurice. The Phenomenology of Perception. Pg. 3 70 -ff. 
60 Merleau-Ponty, Maurice. The Phenomenology of Perception . Pg. 370. 
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of activity matches this account, as the translative understanding of perception sees the event as 
transformed into a neural pattern of activity, brought within the boundary of the organism by 
the neural encoding process. 
Thompson considers the defining function of life to be maintaining the integrity of the 
physical boundary of the individual. His investigation into the activity of a self-sustaining 
physical boundary states what in his work is the principle that unites the concept of mind with its 
articulation in all forms of life - not just humanity or some select group of highly neurologically 
complex organisms. Thompson identifies three ways to think about what life, in general, is. One 
is to define life through the genetic evolutionary process, examining the problems of inheriting 
traits in species and the transformation of population over time. He mention Daniel Dennett as 
the chief proponent of this way of understanding life, particularly as he articulated it in his book 
Darwin's Dangerous Idea in 1995.61 There is also what Thompson calls the ecological 
understanding of life, in which organisms are viewed as "beings that interact constructively with 
their environments, and so change the world in which they and their descendants live. Organisms 
are 'niche-constructing' beings."62 As he explains the ecological conception of life, the focus is on 
the system of the biosphere as a whole as all parts of it are interdependent, and as its elements -
the particular species, ecological niches, and the individual organism - interact in a continual 
harmonic flux, while the biosphere is constantly changing but always maintaining its existence. 
Particular organisms will always die, and particular species of organisms will evolve into others or 
die out altogether; but once the system of the biosphere is present, it will remain as long as the 
planet itself remains. 
Thompson instead begins his examination of what life is with the individual life, the 
singular life. He examines the conditions under which we can take a thing and discover whether 
61 Dennett, Daniel. Darwin's Dangerous Idea: Evolution and the Meanings of Life. Simon and Shuster. 
(1995) 
6
' Thompson, Evan. Mind In Life. Pg. 95. Thompson gives as an example of this absolutizing of ecology as 
the Gaia hypothesis of chemist James Lovelock and microbiologist Lynn Margulis. 
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or not that thing which is physically present in this point in time is alive. He considers the focus 
on the individual as conceptually prior to the other two characterisations of life. In order for there 
to be a reproductively active population, there must be individual members of that population. A 
planet-wide whole biosphere cannot exist without its constituent elements interacting with each 
other, and these elements are all individual, singular lives. The physical self-construction and 
maintenance of this singular unit - this life - is the required condition for the reproductive 
network central to the genetic view of biology and for the holistic growth of the 
intradependently constituted biosphere. This process is autopoiesis, "the paradigm case of 
biological autonomy."63 A system of molecules come together constituting a boundary- the 
molecules arrange themselves such that their system constitutes a unit with a clear inside and 
outside. This bounded system is semi-permeable, so that it takes in other molecules of various 
types which it breaks down in a metabolic chemical reaction such that further molecules which 
compose the bounded system and the boundary itself are generated. Particular chemical reactions 
create new molecular structures that are wall-like in their behaviour. These molecules which 
function as walls connect with each other as a physical boundary to enclose a region of space -
the activity of these wall-functioning molecules constitutes an inside space and an outside space. 
The presence of an organism transforms the significance of space in that an organism 
differentiates the space inside itself from the space outside itself. What was undifferentiated 
becomes, through this activity, an individual and its world. 
This is not to say anything quite so radical as that a single cell has a language and 
understands its environment in the same manner that humans do. What Thompson does here is 
to take those activities of perception and motion - the activities constitutive of mind - and see if 
they can be applied in the context of the single cell. Thompson finds the physical structure that is 
necessary to carry out the activities that constitute mind in the autopoietic body. His analysis of 
autopoiesis has shown that there is enough commonality between the actions of the human 
63 Thompson, Evan. Mind In Life. Pg . 44. 
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individual and the actions of the simplest form of life to say that the activities we colloquially call 
'mental' begin with the formation of a rudimentary life. These actions are those co-constitutive 
activities that occur in the relation of an individual with the world. Even the simplest forms oflife 
perceive and move. In this case, the individual is the autopoietic reaction first constituted from 
the undifferentiated chemical sea. As the individual unit of life is constituted, the activity of this 
individual life is of movement towards certain types of chemicals in its surroundings and its 
absorbing those chemicals as fuel for the maintenance of its physical boundary. This individual 
life opens itself to invasion by chemicals from the outside for fuel, and in thi activity in the 
world constitutes its inner and outer. The individual life - even at its most rudimentary form of 
the autopoietic cell - acts with purpose, moving itself to acquire fuel. Even the simplest life "takes 
root in being and time by taking up a situation,"64 which is how Merleau-Ponty describes what it 
is for an individual to be conscious. In this case, an individual's situation is the self-propelled 
movement to take in fuel for its metabolic reaction. This self-constitutive activity is the simplest 
way of taking up a situation which constitutes the most rudimentary form of mind. The 
activities that constitute mind - perceiving and moving - are found in even the simplest 
organisms, so Thompson concludes that all organisms constitute some manner of mind through 
their activity in the world. 
The enclosing of the boundary encourages the metabolic reactions such that the 
continuance of the metabolic reactions depends on the presence of the boundary, and the 
boundary is produced and maintained by the metabolic reactions. This scenario creates the 
conditions under which the boundary can maintain its integrity and expand - this is the growth 
of the inside space. The central biological structure for this activity of a bounded metabolism is 
the cell. 
A cell stands out from a molecular soup by creating the boundaries that set it apart from 
what it is not. Metabolic processes within the cell determine these boundaries, but the 
•• Merleau-Ponty, Maurice. The Phenomenology of Perception . Pg. 493. 
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metabolic processes themselves are made possible by those very boundaries. Should this 
process of self-production be interrupted, the cellular components no longer form a 
spatially individuated whole and they gradually diffuse back into a molecular soup.65 
It is at this time of the diffusion of the cell that we may say the cell dies. 
An organism - a life - is an enclosed metabolic system of chemical activity, and this 
chemical activity makes possible rudimentary perception and motion. That perception and 
motion makes possible the continuation of the metabolic activity. Such chemical activity is a self-
repairing and self-sustaining process. A multiplicity of cells can come together in relation to each 
other in space, and constitute an autopoietic system among each other- the multicelled 
organism. This does not deny the validity of the genetic account of life, as the vast majority of 
organisms on Earth have a metabolic reaction network consisting of proteins, DNA, and RNA. 
These molecules that constitute the metabolic reaction of the component cells of many 
organisms determine the structure of the bounded system which is the physical body of the 
organism.66 The autopoietic account of life defines what precisely is the activity ofliving. 
Metabolic activity generating an autopoietic system is the activity of physical differentiation -
the creation of an inside and an outside where in the context of the undifferentiated chemical sea, 
there was only motion in space. The concept of translation as a description of the physical 
mechanics of perception is a recognition of this basic boundary of the organism from its world. 
The physical constitution of the organism is defined by the semi-permeable boundary that the 
autopoietic chemical activities create - the boundary of a human organism is literally the shape of 
humanity, its silhouette. The physical mechanism of perception is the translation of the perceived 
event into the neural code - perception is the penetration or invasion of the thing perceived into 
the perceiver, just as Merleau-Ponty described it.67 
Thompson calls the autopoietic process the physical constitution of the organism as 
65 Thompson, Evan. Mind In Life . Pg. 99. 
66 Thompson, Evan. Mind In Life . Pp. 100-3. 
67 Merleau-Ponty, Maurice. The Phenomenology of Perception . Pg. 370. Quoted in §3.2. 
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regulating itself and its environment - what could broadly be defined as homeostasis, the 
maintenance of the organism's status quo. This activity of regulation of the organism and its 
environment is itself the activity of perception and motion, since the organism regulates itself 
through taking in chemical fuel and regulates its environment by moving in it and eating parts 
of it. The autopoietic conception of a life allows us to understand in an explicitly physicalist 
context that perception and motion, the activities of the mutual co-constitution of mind and 
world, are common to all forms of life. Autopoiesis is the physical mechanism of differentiation, 
the metabolic chemical process that is the beginning in time of a life. "A living cell stands out 
from a chemical background as a closed network of self-producing processes that actively 
regulates its encounters with its environment."68 The chemical reaction- metabolism - that 
defines the autopoietic system is the physical activity that constitutes and maintains an individual 
life, and metabolic activity constitutes a dialectical relationship between this unity that we call the 
organism and that which is outside the organism, its surrounding environment. In this dialectical 
relationship we will see the most basic structures of activity of co-constitution of the pattern of an 
individual life articulated in its activity. This relation arises in the interaction between one's 
surroundings and one's own body. Thompson writes: 
The organism is in and of the world, and its identity has to be enacted in the very process 
of living, which is to say in the assimilation of and accommodation to the world. 
Autonomy, far from being exempt from the causes and conditions of the world, is an 
achievement dependent on those very causes and conditions.69 
A life, driven towards self-maintenance through its metabolic activity, interacts with its 
environment such that the environment is altered and the individual life maintains its physical 
integrity such that the metabolic activity continues. The organism transform its environment, 
and the environment transforms the organism, but neither of these relations of transformation 
has any priority over the other. These transformations are concurrent, mutually constituting 
•• Thompson, Evan. Mind In Life. Pg. 149. Thompson is inspired here by the work of Hans Jonas, and 
quotes heavily in this chapter from Jonas' work The Phenomenon of Life: Towards o Philosophical Biology. 
•• Thompson, Evan. Mind In Life . Pg. 150. 
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activities. Merleau-Ponty's phenomenological analysis of this dialectical relationship uses the 
concepts of a body and its world, where Thompson uses the concepts of an organism and its 
environment, but the relationship itself follows the same dialectically constitutive structure in 
both accounts. Where Merleau-Ponty saw this relationship only in human living, Thompson sees 
this relationship in the activity ofliving at its most general. Our analysis of neurophilosophy 
illustrates how one could see this activity of co-constitution as constituting mind when the 
activity takes place within the sensorimotor system of an individual. This is h w neurophilosophy, 
phenomenology, and Thompson's analysis of the organism fit together to outline the philosophy 
of mind as activity. 
There remains still to account for the fact that a bacterium and a human are two 
extremely different lives. The concept of significance we defined at the beginning of this section 
connects all kinds of organisms as articulations of the activities constitutive of mind and 
illustrates the continuity among them all. A life, even in its most rudimentary form, constitutes 
in its activity further articulations of significance in the world of which it is part. Thompson uses 
the example of a simple bacterium floating in a sea of sucrose. 
Although sucrose is a real and present condition of the physicochemical environment, its 
status as food is not. That sucrose is a nutrient is not intrinsic to the st tus of the sucrose 
molecule; it is, rather, a relational feature, linked to the bacterium's metabolism. Sucrose 
has significance or value as food, but only in the milieu that the organism itself brings 
into existence . . . In this way, the environment becomes a place of valence, of attraction 
and repulsion, approach or escape.70 
As a life grows and evolves in complexity, its possibilities of interaction grow and expand - an 
increasingly complex life creates new modes of engagement with its surroun ings, and these 
creative actions constitute new articulations of significance for the world. Here is the parallel of 
this chemical analysis of life and the phenomenological analysis of life. As a life constitutes itself 
in the world, it constitutes novel significances for that world. The individual organism relates 
70 Thompson, Evan. Mind In Life. Pg. 158. 
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itself to its surroundings through its own self-constitutive activity in ways it has never been 
related to anything else before. These new significances are created in the mutual co-constituting 
activity of an individual life and the world in which it lives. 
Thompson's analysis of the co-constitutive activity that is the dialectic of the individual 
and the world lets one understand the creation of a life as a chemical reaction, the first metabolic 
activity. In this chemical activity, there is a physical differentiation, the constitution of a 
boundary that now delineates what is inside and outside. This differentiating is the activity that 
serves as the condition for the possibility of any perceptual activity. Differentiating is the 
constitution of a new thing - a life - which enables, through its activity, the constitution of new 
activities. These new activities constitute significances that would never have existed if there had 
been no organism perceiving and moving in the world. Take Thompson's example of the 
bacterium and the sucrose - the existence of a life constitutes activity which i the perspective of 
presence to the organism creates new significance, while where no life existed there was only 
physical presence. A life's actions are unprecedented because in its very genesis, a new 
significance is constituted, sparking a spiral of further new significances. From the very moment 
of the boundary's formation, space itself has a new significance in the context of this body's 
existence, for there is now an inside and an outside, a new value of location. 
We can see in autopoietic activity the simplest physical formation of the self-constituting 
pattern of activity. Thompson writes: 
The human mind is embodied in our entire organism and in the world. Our mental lives 
involve three permanent and intertwined modes of bodily activity- self-regulation, 
sensorimotor coupling, and intersubjective interaction. Self-regulation is essential to 
being alive and sentient. It is evident in emotion and feeling, and in conditions such as 
being awake or asleep, alert or fatigued, hungry or satiated. Sensorim tor coupling with 
the world is expressed in perception, emotion, and action. Intersubjective interaction is 
the cognition and affectively charged experience of self and other. The human brain is 
crucial for these three modes of activity, but it is also reciprocally shaped and structured by 
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them at multiple levels throughout their life span.7 1 
The constitutive activities of the simplest organisms begin a spiralling pattern of complexity 
which eventually constitutes - after several billion years - the astonishing complexity of the 
world in which humans live and constitute themselves. Sensorimotor coupling, as Thompson and 
Varela explained throughout their work, is in its simplest articulation the creative activity of the 
organism in the world in pursuit of fuel for itself. From this most rudimentary activity ever-
evolving patterns of new significance are constituted in activities of spiralling complexity and 
novelty. Early in the evolution of life, these significances would be relatively simple, like sucrose 
in its presence to the organism being a food, and no longer one existent aggregate among many 
as is its physical presence. The existence of many organisms all engaging in co-constitutive 
activity in the same surroundings and interacting with each other's co-constitutive activities -
what Thompson calls intersubjective interaction - only quickens this process of the spiralling 
constitution of complexity of the pattern of life in the world. Human thinking is one of the 
articulations of the continuing process of this spiralling complexity of the pattern of living 
activity which currently exist. 
Conclusion. Mind as Activity Means Mind Is Common to All Life 
The goal of this thesis was to articulate a non-reductive physicalist concept of mind by 
drawing from sources in several contemporary philosophical traditions. My g teway into 
examining this problem was the question of the nature of qualia of consciousness in philosophy 
of mind. Qualia are dependent on the nature of the sensory organs, and no constancy is to be 
found in the continually shifting qualia of experience. Though we can unders tand the physical 
processes of how qualia of experience come about by examining our sensory organs themselves, 
the physical presence of these organs is the only constancy to them - their activity remains in 
flux. The qualia question is a puzzlement at the existence of qualitative experience that seems to 
7 1 Thompson, Evan. Mind In Life. Pg . 243 . 
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be irreducible to the physical structures of the organism. The qualia of sensory experience exist, as 
I experience colours, sounds, textures, and tastes, but there appears to be no physical correlate to 
my experience of red. The Churchlands offer an interesting solution to the qualia question, since 
they explained qualia as the perceiving function of the neural sensorimotor system - the physical 
activity of the brain and the rest of the neural system in every organism. It was the physical 
structure of the sensory organs that resulted in the qualia of experience, meaning that under the 
neurophilosophical account, qualia were no longer ineffable or unexplainable. We could now 
understand qualia as themselves physical - neuroelectrical patterns in the sensorimotor system of 
sense organs and the relevant neural systems. There is no physical correlate to my experience of 
red because that experience is itself physical. We understand what experiential colour qualia are by 
examining how the eyes work. The same goes for all other sensorimotor systems. At the moment 
of contact with an organism, objects and events which were physically present in the organism's 
surroundings are translated by that organism's physical perceptive apparatus into a pattern of 
neuroelectrical activity. The event as it was physically present was translated into an entirely 
different kind of existence - it was translated from being physically present to being present to 
the organism, from impassive existence to existence as perceived from a subj ctive perspective. 
Patterns of light are translated into qualia of colour, and so on for all other sensorimotor activity. 
One problem remained with our ability to accept the Churchlands' neurophilosophy as a 
solution to the qualia question, the eliminative character of their philosophy, which I said at the 
outset of this thesis was not the direction I thought should be pursued. The eliminative approach 
seeks to render non-neurological accounts of thinking and the propositional attitudes into mere 
metaphor, a mistake of reasoning by way of an artistic play of words. As the Churchlands saw 
matters, to accept neurophilosophical solutions to problems in philosophy of mind, the only 
explanations of mental activity that were taken to have any validity at all were explanations that 
were drawn exclusively from neurology. All non-neurological concepts, they aid, were obsolete 
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so should be abandoned and forgotten. I have investigated the concept, implicit in the 
Churchlands' work, that what we consider the mental is constituted as a pattern of activity. In so 
doing, I have built an example of a physicalist understanding of mind that does not embrace a 
similar reductionism, nor would ever need to. First, I returned to the functionalist philosophies 
for concepts that help develop a satisfactory physicalism, which undercut the eliminativist attack 
on a potentially fruitful philosophy. It is in the work of a functionalist, Lewis, that we found the 
concept of the self-constituting pattern articulated most explicitly. Lewis himself intended it as a 
handy metaphor, but the concept of pattern lets one understand how the activity of thinking and 
perceiving could to constitute an individual mind. The concept of the pattern that constitutes 
itself can be interpreted in the Churchlands' account of the neural system. Later in our 
investigation, we interpret the concept in Merleau-Ponty's account of the individual living in a 
world constituting its own "sedimentary history" through that individual's own action in that 
world. And Thompson also includes this concept in his adaptation of Merleau-Ponty's concept of 
the individual existing in a relation with the world of mutually co-constituti e activity into a 
physicalist philosophy that made the central figure a life. 
Thompson's analysis of the metabolic activity that constitutes a life allows us to see that 
the simple presence of an organism in the world transforms that world insofar as the elements of 
the world now have new, unprecedented, continually more complex ways of existing. When 
there are no organisms, things exist only as their physical presence - a simultaneous co-existence. 
When there is at least one organism, there is now a differentiation into that which is inside the 
boundary of the organism and that which is outside. A thing's relation to an organism - its 
presence to the organism - involves that thing in the ever-spiralling pattern of significance. The 
creation and growth of this pattern of self-constitutive activity is the very definition of life, 
ongoing even in the presence of the simplest life. 
The conclusion of our investigation is the concept of the pattern of a tivity in a world 
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that constitutes itself anew at every moment of its activity. In the physicalist context- even in 
an eliminative perspective - we can see individual mind not as a thing, but as a pattern of neural 
activity. All perceptions and movements are patterns that articulate themselves together through 
the brain, and these patterns produce in their activity taken as a whole the pattern of activity that 
constitutes the individual mind. Once concepts that are not strictly neurological are valid to our 
account of mind and life, we come to understand that the activity of patterning is present in the 
action of all organisms. Humanity has a particular style of patterning in action, but there is a 
style for every type of organism. Depending on how specific one aims one's account of style, 
there is a style of activity for every individual life. The pattern of a life's activity is exactly what 
constitutes that individual life - the pattern of significance in the constitution of one's 
perspective of living in the world, and the pattern in which a life constitutes the significance of 
the world itself through its creative actions, generating the novel and unprecedented. As we have 
identified and analyzed this concept of the pattern of activity that patterns itself through its 
activity, we have found a new way to address the problems of the nature of mind and world 
which avoids many of the conceptual stalemates. Organic activity itself constitutes new 
significance for the world and for its own action, constantly transforming itself and the world 
where it lives, always open to new possibilities that it can constitute in the world. With an open 
attitude towards philosophies not firmly rooted in reductionism and eliminativism, we can create 
a philosophy far more nuanced than the Churchlands' own neurophilosophy which nonetheless 
preserves the most important elements of their thought. The central idea is that the identity of 
the individual organism is constituted in activity. 
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